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INTRODUCTION
hree times the size of France, Turkey rests on the cusp be-
tween Europe and the Middle East. Most of the more than
80 million people are Sunni Muslims.1 Yet almost unique for an
Islamic country, Turkey professes to be a secular state.2
It did not start that way. For almost 500 years, the Anatolian
peninsula was the center of Islam. The sultans of the Ottoman
1. E.g. CIA, THEWORLD FACTBOOK 51, 709 (2013) (noting that 99.8 percent
of Turkey is Muslim, mostly Sunni). The site estimates the population as 80.69
million as of July, 2013. Id.
2. There are fifty-two majority Muslim states. Adrien K. Wing & Ozan O.
Varol, Is Secularism Possible in a Majority-Muslim Country?: The Turkish Ex-
ample, 42 TEX. INT’L L. J. 1, 3 (2006). Only two–Turkey and Senegal–have de-
clared themselves secular in their constitution. Niyazi Oktem, Religion in Tur-
key, 2002 BYU L. REV. 371, 371 (2002). Ethiopia, which is approximately half
Muslim, see id, also has a constitution announcing that it is a secular state.
See ETHIOPIAN CONST. art. 11 (Aug. 21, 1995), available at http://www.af-
rica.upenn.edu/Hornet/Ethiopian_Constitution.html.
T
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Empire assumed the title of Caliph3 and reigned as the spiritual
and temporal leaders of much of the Muslim world.4 Despite this
religious role, the Empire was, for much of its history, a menag-
erie of different faiths.5 A series of wars in the nineteenth cen-
tury, however, stripped away large swathes of territory, includ-
ing those containing most of the non-Islamic populations.6 As Is-
lam strengthened demographically, paradoxically, so did secu-
larism, with reforms introducing law codes from the west.
But it was Mustafa Kemal, or Ataturk, who founded the re-
public and institutionalized secularism. Relying on a policy of
laicism, the government saw its role with respect to religion as
less a separation of mosque and state and more a matter of con-
trol. Islam would be subject to the oversight of the secular au-
thorities. Mosques and religious education were assigned to the
designated ministry; imams received government salaries. Is-
lamic practices and symbols were exorcised from most public in-
stitutions.
The system largely remained in place until the election of the
Justice and Development Party or AKP in 2002. With more overt
religious leanings, the AKP lessened restrictions on some Is-
lamic practices. At the same time, the military lost its tradi-
tional role as the guardian of secularism.
The policies of the AKP generated contradictory interpreta-
tions. To some, they suggested a weakening of secularism and a
rise of conservative Islamic influence. To others, they repre-
sented less a fundamental reconfiguration than a recalibration
3. Salim I became the first Sultan to assume the title of Caliph in 1517.
LORD KINROSS, THE OTTOMAN CENTURIES: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE TURKISH
EMPIRE 10 (1977).
4. As part of that shift, the Sultan moved various artifacts associated with
the Prophet Mohammed from Cairo to Istanbul. They included a lock of his
hair, a letter he wrote to a Coptic official, a footprint, and some of his personal
swords. These items are currently on display in the Topkapi Palace in Istanbul.
See Topkapi Palace, 3D Virtual Tour, TOPKAPI PALACE, http://www.3dmekan-
lar.com/en/topkapi-palace.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2014).
5. See generally Erik-Jan Zürcher, The Ottoman Empire 1850-1922, Una-
voidable Failure? TURKOLOGYUPDATELEIDENPROJECT, at 4–5 (2007) http://me-
nadoc.bibliothek.unihalle.de/menalib/content/titleinfo/1303850.
6. See id (“Until 1878, Christians and Jews made up close to forty percent
of the population.”).
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of the secularist philosophy, one that better reflected the de-
mands of a pluralistic and open society.7
The financial markets in Turkey provide a laboratory to help
resolve these competing views. Islamic law or Sharia contains a
number of proscriptions that directly affect financial practices.
The payment and receipt of interest is prohibited; so are most
kinds of commercial insurance. These interpretations provided
the impetus in the Islamic world for the creation of a class of
banks that sought to offer Sharia compliant services.
For much of the post Ottoman period, Turkey made no effort
to incorporate religious principles into the financial system.
Banks were instead used as instruments of government policy,
designed to funnel capital to designated businesses and indus-
trial complexes. With interest rates subject to government con-
trol and set at levels below inflation, the financial system re-
mained undersized but profitable.
Islamic banks entered Turkey in the 1980s, a consequence of
broader reforms designed to open the financial markets and at-
tract capital. These financial institutions were intended to draw
deposits from religious Turks and capital from foreign investors.
Indeed, funds for the first Islamic banks came mostly from the
Middle East.
Their entry was initially tepid, in no small part because of sec-
ularist principles. Islamic financial institutions could not overtly
advertise their religious orientation. The country had no “Is-
lamic” banks, only finance houses. They were not Sharia compli-
ant but “interest-free.” Moreover, the government left them in
an uncertain regulatory status and subjected them to re-
strictions on growth. In this environment, the Islamic banks re-
mained a peripheral part of the financial system.
With the election of the AKP in 2002, however, the environ-
ment for Islamic banks in Turkey changed. Limitations on
branch networks and capital raising were lifted. The govern-
ment removed restrictions on the issuance of Sharia compliant
bonds. Officials from the Islamic banks were appointed to the
highest levels of government.
7. Thus, the repeal of the ban on the headscarf in government buildings
and higher education, see infra note 163, and the adoption of restrictions on
the sale of liquor, see infra note 164, have been seen as either advancing reli-
gious principles or imposing prudent policies.
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In shaping the banking sector, however, the government did
not wholly embrace Sharia, particularly where religious princi-
ples conflicted with the safety and soundness of the financial
system. This was particularly true with respect to the system of
deposit insurance. The AKP integrated the Islamic banks into a
system of deposit insurance that applied to all financial institu-
tions and did not explicitly comply with the requirements of Sha-
ria.
Similarly, the Islamic banks in Turkey found themselves with
greater freedom to compete. While experiencing significant
growth, they nonetheless remained small, suggesting a modest
demand for religiously based financial services. At least some of
the Islamic banks sought to break out of this niche by competing
more directly with traditional commercial banks. In doing so,
however, they confronted the limits imposed by Sharia. This
could be seen most clearly in connection with the development
of credit cards.
This Article will do several things. First, it will examine prin-
ciples of Islam that affect banking practices, with a particular
emphasis on deposit insurance and credit cards. Second, the Ar-
ticle will discuss the emergence of secularism in Turkey and the
introduction of Islamic banks into the Turkish financial mar-
kets. The Article will then examine their evolution, with partic-
ular emphasis on the changes implemented by the AKP. Finally,
the Article will examine the impact of these reforms, and what
that impact says about Islamic influence in Turkey.
I. ISLAM AND FINANCE
An Islam-based banking system applies principles derived
from Sharia.8 Sharia encompasses all aspects of Islamic law and
“is, in essence, a set of guiding principles rather than unbending
rules.”9 With respect to financial markets, Sharia, among other
things, prohibits both the payment and receipt of interest. As a
result, Islamic banks have developed a number of Sharia com-
pliant alternatives, to these restrictions.
8. Some use the term “Islamic banking.” See, e.g., Chibli Mallat, Commer-
cial Law in the Middle East: Between Classical Transactions andModern Busi-
ness, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 81, 90 (Winter 2000).
9. Paul H. Robinson, et al., Codifying Shari’a: International Norms, Legal-
ity & the Freedom to Invest New Forms, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 10 (2007).
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A. Deposits
Sharia prohibits the payment of Riba, a ban that appears in
the Koran.10 Despite the occasional voice of dissent,11 the term
has generally been applied to all forms of interest, not only those
viewed as usurious.12 Borrowers cannot pay interest; lenders
cannot receive interest.13 Even broader, the ban extends to other
types of return, including penalties charged in the event of a de-
fault.14
The prohibition applies to interest paid on all forms of debt,
including deposits.15 To comply with Sharia, Islamic banks can
accept deposits that provide the security of the vault but offer no
guaranteed return.16 Islamic banks can also accept deposits that
10. Gulberna Ozcan & Murat Cokgezen, Trusted Markets: The Exchanges of
Islamic Companies, 48 COMP. ECON. STUD., 132, 133 n.1 (2006) (“What the Ko-
ran clearly prohibits is Riba, a pre-Islamic practice of doubling the debt of a
borrower who is unable to repay his loan. The definition and content of usury,
and the applicability of verses on Riba to the term ‘interest’ are problematic
issues among Islamic scholars.” (internal citations omitted).
11. See Nico P. Swartz, Can the Model of the Riba—Free Islamic Commer-
cial Bank Provide a New Paradigm for the Future of Global Banking?: A The-
oretical Review, 2 J. GLOBAL BUS. & ECON. 86, 89 (2011) (Riba encompasses
“excessive, exorbitant, and exploitative rate of interest.”).
12. In fact the term has a much wider connotation and can apply to “all
forms of exploitation and excessive charges in business dealings.” Shahnaz
Naughton & Tony Naughton, Religion, Ethics and Stock Trading: The Case of
an Islamic Equities Market, 23 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 145, 145 (2000).
13. As one writer puts it, “Islamic law prohibits interest because it fosters
the accumulation of wealth that is not a product of work.” Hesham M.
Sharawy, Note, Understanding the Islamic Prohibition of Interest: A Guide to
Aid Economic Cooperation Between the Islamic and Western Worlds, 29 GA. J.
INT’L&COMP. L. 153, 161 (2000).
14. See MUHAMMAD TAQIUSMANI, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC FINANCE 91
(2002). See also Shaykh Muhammad ibn Adam al-Kawthari, Monetary Penal-
ties on Late Payment: If a Customer Delays in Paying, Can We Charge Him For
This, QIBLA (Oct. 29, 2014, 7:25 PM), http://qa.sunnipath.com/is-
sue_view.asp?HD=1&ID=1725&CATE=119
15. An exception sometimes exists for Muslims living in the west, where
qualifying financial products are unavailable under the doctrine of darurah or
hardship. As a result, some products, such as conventional mortgages, have
been allowed where a viable Islamic alternative did not exist. See Mortgage for
a Home, MUSLIM INVESTOR (Mar. 13, 2001, 1:00 PM), http://muslim-inves-
tor.com/answers/mortgage-for-a-home.html. In other circumstances, excep-
tions are made where the product is required by secular law. This has applied,
for example, to car insurance requirements.
16. MUHAMMAD AYUB, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC FINANCE 189 (2007). The
banks may, however, provide a return, so long as it is discretionary. Id. From
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pay a return based upon the investment yield of the funds.
Funds are deposited for a defined period of time,17 and incur the
risk of gain18 or loss on any investment.19 Return may, however,
be spread among all of the participation accounts.20 Studies
the perspective of Sharia, deposits are treated as an interest-free loan to the
bank, often under the principle of qard hassan. See Mohammad O. Farooq,
Qard Hasan, Wadiah/Amanah and Bank Deposits: Applications and Misap-
plications of Some Concepts in Islamic Banking, 25 ARAB L. Q., no. 2 (2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1418202.
17. Professor Hamoudi, however, suggests that in fact this is not what the
banks do. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Muhammad’s Social Justice or Muslim
Cant?: Langdellianism and the Failures of Islamic Finance, 40 CORNELL INT’L
L. J. 89, 116 (2007) (noting that “this model is commercially unworkable as an
alternative to the conventional bank system because it offers neither the li-
quidity nor the minimal risk of loss that would be expected of a bank.”).
18. Thus, for example, one of the participating banks in Turkey provided for
a 70 to 30 percent split. See BANK ASYA, DEPOSIT STRUCTURE 10 (2012),
http://www.bankasya.com.tr/en/_pdf/bank_asya_presentation_2012.pdf (defin-
ing participation accounts as “a profit sharing account, whereas 70% of the
revenue generated from this account is contributed to the account holders and
30% remains with the bank”).
19. It is not clear that any Islamic bank has ever passed on losses to account
holders. They have, however, reduced the rate of return. See Masood Ahmed,
Did Islamic Banks in the Gulf Do Better Than Conventional Ones in the Crisis?
IMFDIRECT (Oct. 14, 2009), http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2009/10/14/islamic-
banking/. (“[S]ome Islamic banks have [demonstrated a] flexibility to mitigate
the impact of asset losses through a temporary reduction in the rates of return
to investors.”).
20. At least some banks apparently maintain a reserve fund to protect prin-
cipal, making the payments on a “voluntary” basis. See Mohammed Khnifer,
Towards a Universal Islamic Deposit Insurance System (pts. 1& 2) ISLAMIC
BUS. & FIN. 20, 22 (2010) (“[W]e know that banks retain a fraction of the yearly
shareholders’ income in a special account for shareholders which would be used
to compensate the depositors for any loss of their principal amount that may
occur when taking risks with their money. For instance, a Saudi bank sus-
tained large losses around the same time and its Board of Directors decided to
have the bank’s owners bear this loss on behalf of the owners of the investment
accounts.”). Depositors in investment accounts, therefore, continue to have the
risk of loss, with the risk spread among all such depositors. See ISLAMIC
FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD, ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY STABILITY
REPORT 130 (2013), http://ifsb.org/docs/IFSB%20-
%20IFSI%20Stability%20Report%20TEXT%20FINAL%20(OUTPUT).pdf
[hereinafter ISLAMICFINANCIALSERVICESBOARD]. (“In addition, the Takāful ap-
proach does not eliminate the risk-sharing substance of Muḍārabah contracts
but shifts the risk from the individual IAH to the collective of all IAHs.”).
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show that returns in these accounts roughly equal the interest
paid by conventional banks.21
B. Loans
With respect to loans, Islamic banks may not charge interest.
Sharia, however, permits a number of mechanisms that allow
banks to provide financing, while earning an adequate return.
Under murabaha, or cost plus financing,22 the financial institu-
tion buys the desired goods, takes title―incurring the risk of
21. See HANDBOOK OF ISLAMICBANKING 130 (M. Kabir Hassan & Mervyn K.
Lewis eds., 2007) (“[T]he return on Islamic deposits is roughly kept in line by
management decisions with interest earned on conventional deposits.”). Is-
lamic banks typically match the return of commercial banks, but use means
other than conventional interest payments. See Timur Kuran, Islamic Econom-
ics and the Islamic Subeconomy, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 155, 161 (Autumn 1995)
(noting that, for the most part, returns on interest-bearing accounts and re-
turns in participation accounts are approximately the same as those with com-
mercial banks). See also Ergeç Etem Hakan & Bengül Gülümser, Impact of
Interest Rates on Islamic and Conventional Banks: The Case of Turkey 5
(MPRA Paper No. 29848, 2011), http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/29848/1/MPRA_paper_29848.pdf.. (“It was found in many empir-
ical researches that the change in interest rates may affect not only the depos-
its in conventional banks but also the deposits reserved in Islamic banks.”). To
the extent that rates in participation accounts are similar to interest paid in
traditional deposit accounts, the amount would not include a premium that
reflected the risk of loss. See HANDBOOK OF ISLAMIC BANKING, supra note 21.
(noting that returns paid by Islamic deposits do not “take into consideration
the different risk positions of insured conventional and uninsured Islamic de-
positors, and it does not reflect the risk profile of the assets of the Islamic
bank.”).
22. Walid S. Hegazy, Contemporary Islamic Finance: From Socioeconomic
Idealism to Pure Legalism, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 581, 598 (2007) (“Today, muraba-
hah represents more than 70 percent of all financial structures used by” Is-
lamic financial institutions.). See also Hamoudi, supra note 17, at 119 (noting
that approximately 80 to 95 percent “of the funds of Islamic financial institu-
tions are employed in Murabaha transactions.”).
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loss23―then sells them to the client.24 The sales price includes
both the cost of the underlying asset and the bank’s profit.25
Cost plus sales traditionally occurred in a single transaction.26
In modern financial systems, murabaha has commonly been
used to permit repayment through installments. As a result,
they function in a manner similar to interest-bearing loans.
Moreover, banks can provide for rapid conveyance of title to the
customer, thereby significantly reducing the period of owner-
ship, as well as reducing the risk of loss.27
II. ISLAM AND CREDIT CARDS
A. Overview
Credit cards illustrate the complexities involved in applying
Sharia to modern financial products. Traditional credit cards
typically offer interest-free loans during a short grace period.
Thereafter, banks charge interest on any outstanding balance
and impose penalties for late payments. Some, but not all, credit
cards impose an annual fee, although the amount is usually
23. See Usmani, supra note 14, at 12. (“It is one of the basic requirements
for the validity of murabahah that the commodity is purchased by the financier
which means that he assumes the risk of the commodity before selling it to the
customer. The profit claimed by the financier is the reward of the risk he as-
sumes.”).
24. The commodity or good must be in existence at the time of the sale. See
Risk Management in Murabaha, PAKISTAN’S BANKS’ ASS’N (2005),
http://www.pakistanbanks.org/career_development/am/articles/08-05-
01_01.html. (“One disturbing trend is the use of murabaha for financing non-
commodity needs, such as holidays, house renovations and other similar finan-
cial needs which fall under the grey definition of commodities.”).
25. The bank must disclose its actual cost to the buyer. See Usmani, supra
note 14, at 65–66.
26. HANDBOOK OF ISLAMIC BANKING, supra note 21, at 174 (“Originally, mu-
rabaha was not conceived of as a mode of finance, since it was not necessarily
concluded on the basis of deferred payment. Murabaha sale for cash was the
rule rather than the exception. The shift to credit murabaha, or murabaha with
deferred price, is a first requisite for its transformation into a technique of fi-
nance.”).
27. Hegazy, supra note 22, at 600. (“Notice that, however, in terms of risk
and profit sharing, the bank or lender/seller in themurabaha transaction only
holds the risk in between the two sales. Of course, the bank can (and does)min-
imize this risk by conducting the two sales within a short period or even sim-
ultaneously.”).
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modest. Issuers also receive fees from the merchants that accept
the cards.28
Islamic compliant credit cards confront a number of limita-
tions under Sharia. Sharia generally prohibits both the pay-
ment of interest and the imposition of penalties. Moreover, ex-
tensions of credit can encourage profligate spending and the ac-
cumulation of debt, something Islamic law discourages.29 Initial
forays into this area, therefore, often involved debit30 or prepaid
cards.31
28. For a discussion of credit card practices, see U.S. GOV’TACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, CREDIT CARDS: INCREASED COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND FEES HEIGHTENS
NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES TO CONSUMERS, GAO-06-929 (2006),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06929.pd. See alsoAYUB, supra note 16, at 379.
29. Some assert that credit cards are inconsistent with Sharia because they
encourage unnecessary consumption. ILHAM REZA FERDIAN, ET AL., THE
PRACTICE OF ISLAMIC CREDIT CARDS: A COMPARATIVE LOOK BETWEEN BANK
DANAMON INDONESIA’SDIRHAMCARD ANDBANK ISLAMMALAYSIA’SBI CARD 1, 10
(2008), http://staff.ui.ac.id/system/files/users/miranti.kartika/publica-
tion/200808iaeiconferenceislamiccreditcard.pdf (“Some of them argued that
the issuance of Islamic credit card will support the consumerism which is not
allowed in Islam.”). See also Salman Ahmed Shaikh, Islamic Credit Cards: A
Necessity or Luxury? (Dec. 28, 2011), http://islamicfinanceandbanking.blog-
spot.com/2011_12_01_archive.html. (“Some financial institutions in Islamic
countries have developed Islamic Credit Cards for consumer financing. Prob-
lems arise due to the fact that credit cards could be used for impulsive buying
or even the fulfillment of one’s needs while not involving a tangible asset.”).
Others point to the propensity of cards to encourage debt. See SHOCHRUL
ROHMA, ISLAMICCREDITCARDS: ACOMPARISONSTUDYBETWEEN ITS APPLICATION
IN MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA, 1, 20, available at http://www.aca-
demia.edu/3148093/Islamic_Credit_Cards_A_Comparison_Study_be-
tween_Its_Application_in_Malaysia_and_Indonesia (last visited Mar. 31,
2015) (“In addition, some Indonesian Muslim scholars reject the issuing of Is-
lamic credit card[s] because the credit card is [the] same as a debt, whereas [a]
debt is one thing which is not recommended in Islam.”).
30. See Rodney Wilson, The Development of Islamic Finance in the Gulf Co-
operation Council 16 (Kuwait Program on Development, Governance and Glob-
alization in the Gulf States, Working Paper, 2009), http://www.cimag-
lobal.com/Documens/Islamic%20finance/2011/Press%20cuttings/development-
of-IF-in-the-GCC.pdf (“Initially Islamic banks only offered debit cards to their
current-account customers.”).
31. Even with respect to these types of cards, limits may exist. Banks cannot
provide “rewards” that result in the violation of Islamic law. AYUB, supra note
16, at 381 (noting that cardholders may not be awarded gifts inconsistent with
Sharia, including “conventional life insurance, entrance to prohibited places or
prohibited gifts.”).
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Nonetheless, Sharia generally permits banks to issue cards, so
long as they are structured in a manner consistent with Islamic
principles.32 In doing so, banks confront three main issues. First,
the card cannot be used to make haram, or “sinful,” purchases.
Second, the card cannot impose interest. Third, the card must
address the problem of late payments in the context of Sharia’s
prohibition on penalties.
B. Impermissible Purchases
Sharia compliant credit cards cannot be used to make “sinful”
or haram purchases.33 Other types of restrictions may also exist.
For example, the purchase of gold, silver, and foreign currencies
cannot be done on credit,34 although this position is not uni-
formly accepted.35
To prevent improper purchases, Islamic banks rely on two
basic approaches. Sometimes they reject a charge at the point of
sale.36 This can be done on a business-by-business basis. Thus,
cards commonly will not work at casinos and bars.37 A blunt ap-
proach, businesses often sell a mix of sinful and nonsinful
32. See THE COUNCIL OF THE ISLAMIC FIQH ACADEMY, RESOLUTION NO. 108
(2/12), ON “CREDIT CARDS” 249 (2000), http://www.irtipms.org/PubText/73.pdf
[hereinafter THE COUNCIL] (“It is permissible to issue credit cards that do not
carry a condition of imposing interest on the credit.”).
33. See FERDIAN, ET AL., supra, note 29, at 2 (“The holders of the card are
only permitted [to] carry out halal transactions, which exclude transactions
related with six categories that [do not] meet Shariah requirements. These
categories are bars, discos, night clubs, purchase of beers, escort and massage
services and gambling.”).
34. The Fiqh Academy has also indicated that they may not be used for the
purchase of certain precious metals. See THE COUNCIL, supra note 32.
35. See Email from Prof. Dr. Monzer Kahf, Islamic Finance and Economics,
Faculty of Islamic Studies, (Dec. 6, 2011) (on file with author) (noting that, in
connection with the purchase of gold, silver, or currencies, “no delay is permis-
sible” but that “it is permissible to buy gold with a credit card because payment
is now credited electronically at the time of the sale and delivery.”).
36. See Posting of Adrian Chan, Beware of HSBC Amanah Credit Card,
LOWYAT.NET (Feb 9, 2010), http://forum.lowyat.net/topic/1323270/all [hereinaf-
ter, Chan Comment].
37. See e.g., MASHREQ AL ISLAMI, MASHREQ AL ISLAMI CREDIT CARDS FAQS,
http://www.mashreqalislami.com/en/mashreq-al-islami-credit-card/im-
ages/Mashreq-Al-Islami-credit-cards-FAQs.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2015)
(“Yes; since Mashreq Al Islami Platinum Credit Card is based on Shari’a prin-
ciples, then it cannot be used for transactions prohibited by “Islam” such as
gambling, liquor, and transactions at clubs, Pubs and Casinos etc. Such trans-
actions will be not be considered and declined immediately.”)
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goods.38 Purchases at grocery stores and hotels can involve prod-
ucts that are both haram and halal.39 In these cases, Islamic
banks typically rely on self-enforcement. Cardholders agree, as
part of the account opening process, to avoid sinful purchases.
The bank reserves the right to cancel the card in the event of
noncompliance.40
Self-enforcement presupposes that individuals are fully aware
of the distinction between proper and improper transactions. De-
scriptions contained in account opening agreements, however,
can lack specificity.41 Moreover, while banks can cancel a card
for improper use, this suggests a willingness to rigorously mon-
itor purchases and devote the resources to effective enforcement.
To the extent that this occurs, it can increase the costs associ-
ated with the issuance of an Islamic compliant credit card.
38. For a threaded discussion contending that an Islamic credit card did not
process transactions at Domino’s Pizza because the nature of the business did
not comply with halal, see Chan Comment, supra note 35.
39. Some music is considered haram. See Fatwa: Is Music Haram?,
ISLAMAWARENESS.NET, http://www.islamawareness.net/Music/mu-
sic_fatwa005.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2015) (“The subject matter of songs
should not be against the teachings of Islam. For example, if the song is in
praise of wine, and it invites people to drink, singing or listening to it is ha-
ram.”). Barring purchases from iTunes would, presumably, generate consumer
resistance.
40. See AAOIFI Standard No. 2, definition 2/3(b) (“The institution must
stipulate that the cardholder may not use the card for purposes prohibited by
the Shari’a and that the institution has the right to withdraw the card in case
such a condition is violated.”). As the account agreement for RHB Islamic Bank
provides, the card may be cancelled “[i]f the Cardholder uses the Card for any
unlawful activities or non-halal activities including but not limited to illegal
online betting or purchase of non-halal goods at non-halal businesses and
premises.” RHB ISLAMIC CREDIT CARD, RHB CARDHOLDER AGREEMENT 13
http://www.rhb.com.my/islamic_banking/cards/pdfs/RHBiB_CC_TnC.pdf (last
visited Feb. 15, 2015).
41. The credit card agreement for Ajman Bank in the UAE provides that the
card cannot be used “for any unlawful purpose, including the purchase of goods
or services, prohibited by Islamic Sharia or any applicable laws wherever the
Card is used” and cannot be used “to commit any act, which is against Islamic
Shari’a principles.” AJMAN BANK, CREDIT CARD CARDHOLDER AGREEMENT 13
http://www.ajmanbank.ae/SiteCollectionDocu-
ments/Ajman%20Bank%20Credit%20Card%20Terms%20and%20Condi-
tions.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
2015] SHARIA AND TURKISH FINANCE 419
C. Prohibition on Interest
In addition to the prohibition on improper purchases, Islamic
credit cards cannot charge interest.42 The restriction represents
the most significant challenge in structuring a Sharia compliant
credit card. Islamic banks have sought to find interpretations of
Sharia that allow a credit card to be cost effective and profitable
but do not result in the imposition of interest.
1. Ujrah
While Islamic banks cannot charge interest, they can impose
fees, ujrah, for services provided.43 Banks may, therefore, charge
merchants a fee for accepting the card.44
With respect to cardholders, however, matters are more com-
plicated. Fees are permitted so long as they compensate Islamic
banks for the services provided and are not a form of disguised
interest. As a result, annual and renewal fees are permitted.45
In addition, Islamic banks may impose fees on transactions de-
signed to recoup the administrative costs of the transaction.46 In
42. See THE COUNCIL, supra note 32, at 249–50. (“It is permissible in
Shari’ah to issue Credit Cards that do not carry a condition of imposing inter-
est on the debt.”).
43. See AYUB, supra note 16, at 381 (describing credit card issued by Emir-
ates Islamic Bank and noting that it included “yearly service charge” that was
“payable on a quarterly basis.”).
44. See THE COUNCIL, supra note 32, at 250 (stating that “[p]ermissibility
for the issuer to take a commission on the goods or services purchased by the
bearer, provided that such goods or services are sold at the same price whether
in cash or credit” is taken under consideration.). See also Wilson, supra note
30, at 16 (“There can be no interest charges on debit balances with Islamic
credit cards, but, as with conventional credit cards, the issuers, in this case
Islamic banks, receive a commission from the retailer proportionate to the
amount of the transactions in return for a guaranteed payment.”).
45. See THECOUNCIL, supra note 32, at 250 (considering the “[p]ermissibility
for the issuer to take from the bearer a specific amount of money at the time of
issuing or renewal of the Card, which] [] constitutes the actual fee that the
issuer deserves according to the services it provides to the bearer.”).
46. Mohammad ‘Ali Elgari ibn Eid, Unsecured Installment Credit Cards, 3
J. ISLAMIC FIQU ACAD. OIC 95, 98 (2006), http://uaelaws.files.word-
press.com/2012/05/unsecured-installment-credit-cards.pdf [hereinafter Elgari]
(“One of the alternative structures adopted by some Islamic banks is issuance
of a card that allows the client to pay the debt created by the use of the card on
a monthly basis in twelve installments without any attendant interest . . . .
The issuance and the renewal fee are higher than normal. And then a special
fee is added with each use of the card. This is fixed and not linked with the
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general, however, the charges must be fixed in amount and can-
not be calculated as a percentage of the outstanding balance.47
Some credit cards using this approach charged substantial an-
nual fees.48 In these cases, credit was limited in amount and
mandatory repayment schedules were short, with as much as
one-third of the balance required to be repaid each month.49
These features tended to make the cards unpopular with con-
sumers.50
2. Tawarruq and Bay’al inah
Some Islamic banks, particularly in Saudi Arabia, rely on the
principle of tawarruq, sometimes referred to as a commoditymu-
rabaha, a three party transaction. Under this approach, the
bank takes the unpaid balance and purchases an asset, often a
tenure or amount used. And there are some other fees associated with a cash
withdrawal from the machine . . . and so on.”). The fee itself cannot be tied to
the amount borrowed.
47. Email from Prof. Dr. Monzer Kahf , Islamic Finance and Economics, Qa-
tar Faculty of Islamic Studies (Sept. 27, 2011) (on file with author) (noting that
some credit cards charge fixed “administrative fees” for “managing the credit
card account” with unpaid balances and noting that this approach is “not per-
missible according to the OIC Fiqh Academy and all [respected] Shari’ah schol-
ars.”). See also ZAHARIM YAAKOB, ISLAMIC CARD BASED ON MUSHARAKAH
MUTANAQISAH 1, 4 (Aug. 2011), available at http://www.aca-
demia.edu/1015645/Islamic_Card_based_on_Musharakah_Mutanaqisah
[hereinafter YAAKOB] (“Islamic Credit Cards may also operate on the Ujrah
concept which is based on a fixed fee structure, meaning that only fixed fee will
be charged to the customer. The Card would not be levied with any floating
percentage fee dependent upon the outstanding balance.”).
48. In other cases, interest is avoided by extending credit only during the
grace period. See Elgari, supra note 46 (describing “single pay” credit cards and
noting the amount charged “must be paid in one payment, usually within three
weeks”).
49. For a description of a credit card using this model, see AYUB, supra note
16, at 383 (describing the Al Tayseer Credit Card issued by the Kuwait Finance
House).
50. Elgari, supra note 46 (“This card did not achieve the success hoped for
it. The reason is that most people carry a credit card just in case, i.e. in order
to have the means of payment ready if needed. Considerable time may pass
without using it; therefore, they prefer a card where a fee is charged only upon
its use, but the fee of this card is linked to the issuance itself, and the card
holder must pay it whether he uses the card or not.”). See also Wilson, supra
note 30, at 16 (“Some banks charge an annual fee, but, given the competition
from other card issuers, Al Rajhi Bank and Dubai Islamic Bank no longer
charge fees.”).
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commodity, from a third party then resells it at a loss.51 Monthly
charges on unpaid balances are treated not as interest but as an
investment loss.
Other Islamic banks, particularly in Malaysia,52 have relied on
bay’al inah, a two party transaction that involves the purchase
of an asset, often land, by the account holder directly from the
bank.53 The land is then resold to the bank at a loss. To the ex-
tent the card balance is not repaid within the grace period, the
bank recovers a portion of the loss.54
Bay’al inah and tawarruq allow Islamic banks to issue credit
cards that charge a percentage of the unpaid balance carried
over from month to month.55 Both approaches, however, have
been criticized and are not widely accepted by Sharia scholars.
51. Often these transactions occur in the London Metal Exchange. See
Email from Prof. Dr. Monzer Kahf, Islamic Finance and Economics, Faculty of
Islamic Studies (Sept. 27, 2011) (“[T]he contract allows the bank to buy copper
from LME for the unpaid balance and sells it to the holder due next month at
a marked up price, then sells it on behalf of the customer to pay the balance.
This is repeated every month on the moment the holder makes a partial pay-
ment.”).
52. Most in Malaysia adhere to the Shafi’i school of Islamic jurisprudence.
See ABU UMAR FARUQ AHMAD, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN ISLAMIC
FINANCE: THECASEANALYSIS FROMAUSTRALIA 79 (2010). The use of bay’al inah
is accepted by this school of Islamic jurisprudence, but not the others. See Amir
Shaharuddin, The Bay’ al-Inah Controversy in Malaysian Islamic Banking, 26
ARAB L. Q. 499 (2012), available at http://www.aca-
demia.edu/5167368/The_Bay_al-Inah_Controversy_in_Malaysian_Is-
lamic_Banking.
53. Shaharuddin, supra note 52, at 5. The use of bay’al inah illustrates the
differences in the Islamic schools of jurisprudence. This interpretation arises
out of the Shafi’i school of thought, one of the four schools recognized by Sunni
Muslims. Although not limited to Malaysia, it is the predominate school of
thought in that country. See id. (“The Malaysian shari’ah scholars had fa-
voured the opinion of al-Shafi’i in accepting the bay’al-Inah contract in creating
a number of Islamic banking products.”). The interpretation of bay’al inah is
not, however, recognized by most other schools of Islamic jurisprudence. See
id.
54. For a description of the approach, see AYUB, supra note 16, at 382.
55. One significant difference, however, is that the monthly charge is not
typically compounded. See Louise Baxter, How Does an Islamic Credit Card
Work?, SOUCQALMAL.COM (Nov. 7, 2013)
http://www.souqalmal.com/blog/creditcards/how-does-an-islamic-credit-card-
work/ (“Other Islamic banks, however, may choose to levy a profit rate on out-
standing balances with preferential rates awarded to customers whose salary
transfers into the bank. Unlike conventional banking, the profit rate levied is
non-compounding.”).
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Bay’al inah has, for the most part, been rejected by Islamic
scholars in the Middle East.56 Similarly, tawarruq has been crit-
icized by the OIC Fiqh Council.57
3. Al-Kafalah
Other approaches have been used in developing Sharia com-
pliant credit cards. Relying on the recognized right to collect a
fee for services, some banks, particularly in Malaysia and Bru-
nei, guarantee payment to the merchant each time a transaction
occurs.58 The fee is charged to the card holder in return for this
service. The fee is expressed as a percentage of the item pur-
chased.59
56. SeeMohd Zulkifli Muhammad, et al., Comprehensive Approach for Sha-
ria Compliance E-Commerce Transaction, 16 J. INTERNETBANKING&COMM. 1,
11 (2011) (“But the doctrine of Bay al-Inah is not recognized by some scholars
from Middle-East.”). See also RAFIDAHAZLI&AZMANMOHDNOOR, ISSUANCE OF
ISLAMICCREDITCARD INMALAYSIA: ACRITICALANALYSIS 2 (2009) (“Themajority
of scholars reject bay’ al-’inah as a valid mode of sale.”). See YAAKOB, supra
note 47, at 3 (“The majority of the jurists were of the opinion that Bai Inah was
not permissible because it was the way or hilah (legal excuse) to legitimize
Riba. The Maliki and Hanbali School rejected Bai Inah and considered it inva-
lid.”).
57. The Fiqh Council of the Organization of Islamic Countries issued a
fatwa challenging this use of tawarruq. See Resolution 179 (19/5). A copy of the
resolution is attached as an appendix to Fatwa in Islamic Finance, ISLAMIC
SHARI’AH RESEARCH ACADEMY FOR ISLAMIC FINANCE, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 2013,
http://www.ifikr.isra.my/documents/10180/16168/blp-isra%20sep%20bulle-
tin%20Tawarruq.pdf. For a discussion of this ruling, see Nikan Firoozye, Ta-
warruq: Shariah Risk or Banking Conundrum, OPALESQUE.COM (July 3, 2009),
http://www.opal-
esque.com/OIFI12/Featured_Structure_Tawarruq_Shariah_Risk_orBanking4
38.html.
58. See Credit Card, BANK ISLAM BRUNEI DARUSSALAM,
http://www.bibd.com.bn/consumer/cards/credit-card/ (last visited Oct. 23,
2014) (“In Kafalah, the customer gives the bank collateral and pays a fee to the
bank as security in exchange for the bank’s guarantee/surety. This guarantee
or surety issued by the bank whereby the bank guarantees to discharge the
liability of a customer should the customer default in fulfilling his obliga-
tions.”).
59. FERDIAN, ET AL., supra note 29, at 8 (“The Dirham Card holder has to
pay 3% administration cost of the total amount of transaction . . . . That prac-
tice is different with a conventional credit card. The conventional card holder
will not be charged with the interest fee if he/she is able to pay before the due
time.”).
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The payment of these fees differs from traditional interest in a
number of respects. The full amount of the charge is owed at the
time of the transaction but can be repaid in installments. There
is no grace period and no automatic reduction for early repay-
ment.60
Not all Sharia scholars agree, however, that the imposition of
fees in return for a payment guarantee is an appropriate inter-
pretation of Islamic law. Fees in general may be recovered to the
extent designed to provide reimbursement for actual costs. The
charges paid for guarantees, however, are often expressed not as
a flat fee but as a percentage of the amount charged. More im-
portantly, many scholars interpret Sharia as prohibiting
charges for a guarantee.61
4. Murabaha
A number of banks, particularly those from countries in the
Gulf Cooperation Council,62 rely on the principle ofmurabaha in
structuring their credit cards.63 Under this approach, the card-
holder is designated as an agent, or wakil, of the bank. As a re-
sult, the bank, not the customer, acquires title to the goods at
the time of purchase. The bank then resells the goods to the card
60. Banks can, however, voluntarily forego portions of the fee in the event
of repayment.
61. Elgari, supra note 46 (discussing the different positions on the right to
accept a fee for a guarantee of repayment to a merchant).
62. Mohammed Khnifer, Maslaha and the Permissibility of Organized Ta-
warruq, 8 OPALESQUE ISLAMIC FIN. INTELLIGENCE 6 (2010) (noting that mura-
baha is the “the basis of many credit card transactions (primarily in the GCC
region”). The GCC consists of the countries on the Arabian Peninsula, exclud-
ing the Republic of Yemen. They include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qa-
tar, the United Arab Emirates, and the Sultanate of Oman. Gulf Cooperation
Council, BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EB-
checked/topic/249154/Gulf-Cooperation-Council-GCC (last updated Feb. 18,
2014).
63. See AYUB, supra note 16, at 383. Some credit cards also rely on Ijhara,
or leasing. See also Baytik Ijhara, Card-Retail Banking, KUWAIT FINANCE
HOUSE, http://www.kfh.bh/en/retail-banking/baytik-ijara-card.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Baytik Ijhara Card]. See also Giving Credit to
Islamic Payment Cards, BANKING & PAYMENTS ASIA (Oct. 1, 2009),
http://www.bankingandpaymentsasia.com/news/giving-credit-to-islamic-pay-
ment-cards-1811735539 (“Kuwait Finance House in Bahrain has an Ijhara-
based card, in which the customer is allowed to purchase consumer durable
goods on the bank’s behalf. The bank subsequently leases the goods purchased
back to the customer.”).
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holder at a price that includes both the cost of the goods and the
bank’s profit. The card holder repays the amount in install-
ments.
Murabaha as a basis for a credit card raises a number of is-
sues. The card holder agrees to repurchase the goods in the ac-
count opening documents, before the bank has title. As a result,
the transfer takes place instantaneously at the time the credit
card is used. Banks, therefore, do not incur any meaningful risk
of loss.64 Murabaha also generally requires payment of the
bank’s profit even if the balance is repaid before the expiration
of the installment period.65
Murabaha cannot be used for all items. Murabaha applies to
the sale of tangible assets.66 This does not include, for example,
the payment of taxes and certain utility bills.67 Nor can the ap-
proach be used for cash withdrawals.68 Islamic banks allowing
cash withdrawals, therefore, cannot add “profit” to the amount
and are, for the most part, limited to a “flat service fee” that can-
not be related to the amount borrowed.69
64. See AHMAD, supra note 52, at 200 (noting that one criticism ofMurabaha
transactions is that “in Murabaha the customers accept the offer of the bank,
in which they bind themselves to purchase the goods before the bank has ap-
proached the supplier.”).
65. AYUB, supra note 16, at 232 (“the majority of contemporary Shari’ah
scholars do not allow remission for earlier payment in murabaha operations
by banks.”). Nonetheless, some banks voluntarily forego the additional
monthly charges upon early repayment.
66. A credit card using Murabaha may also use other Islamic principles
such as Ijhara, or a lease to permit additional purchases. Ijhara can, for exam-
ple, be used for services. See Email from Prof. Dr. Monzer Kahf, Islamic Fi-
nance and Economics, Faculty of Islamic Studies, to author (Aug. 28, 2013) (on
file with author).
67. Water is considered tangible but electricity and phone are not. SeeEmail
from Prof. Dr. Monzer Kahf, Islamic Finance and Economics, Faculty of Islamic
Studies, to author (Sept. 4, 2013) (on file with author). See also DALLAH AL-
BARAKA GROUP, DEPARTMENT OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, SHARIA
OPINIONS (FATWA) ON MURABAHA, 455−56, http://www.albaraka.com/me-
dia/pdf/Research-Studies/RSMR-200706201-EN.pdf (under murabaha profit
may be calculated on the basis of goods “plus other costs” including service
related to the good). Likewise, murabaha cannot be used to pay the “cost of
labor.” Id. at 451.
68. See AYUB, supra note 16, at 381 (noting that cash withdrawals are per-
mitted “provided no interest is charged”).
69. Id. Other interpretations of Sharia are occasionally used as a basis for
credit cards issued by Islamic banks. Ijhara allows the bank to purchase the
good at the point of sale and lease it back to the customer for an agreed amount.
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D. The Problem of Late Payments
Islamic credit cards also confront the problem of late pay-
ments. Conventional financial institutions impose penalties on
late payments. Sharia, however, prohibits the practice.70
Islamic banks can respond to late payments by cancelling the
card, blacklisting the customers, or accelerating the amount
due.71 None of these methods, however, ensure repayment.
Banks may also establish a lien against the cardholder’s salary
or require collateral.72 Collateral usually takes the form of a sep-
arate account with funds that can be tapped in the event of a
failure to make a payment.73
Nonetheless, Islamic banks do in fact sometimes impose pen-
alties for late payments. Because the practice is generally
viewed as inconsistent with Sharia, the proceeds cannot be
For a card based upon this principle, see Baytik Ijhara Card, supra note 63. As
the terms specify, title reverts to the card holder at the end of the lease period.
70. COUNCIL OF THE ISLAMIC FIQH ACADEMY, Resolution No. 109 (3/12): On
“Penalty Provisions,” in RESOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COUNCIL
OF THE ISLAMIC FIQH ACADEMY 1985-2000, at 200, 251 (2000) (reaffirming that
upon delay in due installments “no additional charge should be imposed” be-
cause such “a practice amounts to a commitment of prohibited usury.”).
71. See Khidr Al-Marhoun, Saudi Banks Blacklist Over 100,000 Clients,
ARABNEWS, http://www.arabnews.com/node/212302 (last updated July 7, 2012,
4:28 PM) (“Over 106,000 Saudis and expatriates were blacklisted by Saudi
banks until the end of Nov. 2000.”). See also ISLAMICCREDITCARDAGREEMENT,
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK, http://www.sib.ae/media-
files/2011/07/12/20110712_Credit-Card-TCs-English-Final-30-06-2010-as-per-
Sharia-Legal.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). (“Collateral is required in many
cases; most banks require an underlying deposit or undated check.”).
72. Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank (ADIB) requires an account that contains the
amount of the credit limit for the card. Purchases are taken from this account.
See COVERED CARDS: TERMS AND CONDITIONS, ABU DHABI ISLAMIC BANK,
http://www.adib.ae/sites/default/files/u7/adib-terms-and-conditions.pdf (last
visited Oct. 27, 2014). See also Al-Tayseer Platinum Standard Package,
KUWAIT FINANCIAL HOUSE, http://www.kfh.com/en/banking-services/credit-
cards/al-tayseer-platinum-standard-package.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2014)
(requiring a “salary account” or a deposit account with the bank as a condition
for receiving a credit card). A mandatory deposit does not violate Sharia, alt-
hough profit from the account should be shared between the bank and card-
holder. AYUB, supra note 16, at 380.
73. See Lisa Rogak, Shariah-compliant Credit Cards becomeMore Common,
CREEDITCARDS.COM (July 29, 2008), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-
news/shariah-compliant-credit-cards-1273.php.
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treated as profit and must be donated to charity.74 Not everyone,
however, agrees with this approach.75
E. Observations
Sharia scholars have, for the most part, approved of the issu-
ance of credit cards by Islamic banks, so long as they otherwise
conform with religious precepts. The attributes of the cards and
their basis in Islamic law have varied. Moreover, the require-
ments of Islam at least sometimes limit the use of these cards.
The widespread availability of credit cards issued by traditional
banks provides cardholders with a mechanism to avoid these
limitations.
III. DEPOSIT INSURANCE
A. Overview
Financial systems commonly rely on deposit insurance. Insur-
ance increases confidence in the financial system by guarantee-
ing repayment to depositors in the event of a bank failure. These
systems are often self-funded through premiums paid by banks.
Deposit insurance, however, raises concerns under Sharia.
Islam prohibits the practice of gharar, something typically
translated as excessive uncertainty or risk. Risk exists on a con-
tinuum. Matters of pure chance such as gambling are prohib-
ited.76 Other areas of uncertainty such as market risk from in-
vestment in corporate stocks are typically allowed. Gharar has
generally been interpreted to prohibit commercial insurance,
whether property or life.77
74. See Ayub, supra note 16, at 454 (noting that Sharia scholars have al-
lowed the imposition of penalties for default but “the penalty amount has to be
spent on charity and cannot become part of the income of the bank.”).
75. See Taking A Fine On Delayed Credit Card Payments, ISLAMAWEB (Aug.
8, 2006), http://www.islamweb.net/emainpage/in-
dex.php?page=showfatwa&Option=FatwaId&Id=92320 (“As for taking a fine
on delayed payments, it is forbidden as it is clear Riba (interest and/or usury).
The excuse of the banks that they will spend this amount in charity does not
justify their practice. Any loan that avails benefit is Riba. Signing the contract
of a credit card is not allowed if it contains paying a fine on delayed pay-
ments.”).
76. See Umar Moghul & Arshad Ahmed, Contractual Forms in Islamic Fi-
nance Law, 27 FORDHAM INT’LL. J. 150, 170–72 (2003). The prohibition extends
to some forward contracts. Id.
77. AYUB, supra note 16, at 418–19.
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With elements of uncertainty, deposit insurance must over-
come the prohibition on gharar.78 Sharia has been interpreted to
permit the use of deposit insurance under the Islamic principle
ofmaslahah or public interest.79 Such a system provides benefits
to the public and improves the competitive position of Islamic
banks.80
B. Deposit Insurance and Participation Accounts
Assuming deposit insurance is acceptable under Sharia, a sys-
tem that covers deposits in demand accounts raises few con-
cerns. Systems that seek to cover funds in participation ac-
counts, however, raise more complex issues. Paid a return based
upon investment performance, these deposits must bear the risk
of loss. To the extent that they are covered by insurance, the risk
is eliminated, at least in the case of a failed bank.
An Islamic compliant approach could simply exclude these de-
posits from any insurance scheme.81 Such an approach, however,
78. See INT’LASSOC. DEPOSIT INSURERS, Deposit Insurance from the Shariah
Perspective 9 (Islamic Deposit Insurance Group of the International Associa-
tion of Deposit Insurers, Discussion Paper, 2010),
http://www.iadi.org/docs/DI_from_Shariah_Perspective.pdf [hereinafter Dis-
cussion Paper] (“The uncertainty element exists in deposit insurance in respect
of the failure of a bank. Nevertheless, such uncertainty may not be prohibited
as it is unavoidable and naturally embedded in deposit insurance.”).
79. Id. at 3. (“Deposit insurance contains the element of public interest, and
therefore is permissible under Shariah.”).
80. See ISLAMICBANKING&TAKAFULDEPARTMENT, RESOLUTIONS OFSHARIAH
ADVISORY COUNCIL OF BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA, available at http://www.aca-
demia.edu/526031/Shariah_Resolution_-_BNM [hereinafter SHARIAH
ADVOCACY COUNCIL] (“In Islamic banking, the implementation of a deposit in-
surance scheme is equally important to ensure that the Islamic banking depos-
its are able to compete with the conventional deposits in attracting custom-
ers.”). See also Email from Prof. Dr. Monzer Kahf, Islamic Finance and Eco-
nomics, Faculty of Islamic Studies, to the author (Dec. 1, 2011) [hereinafter
Prof. Dr. Monzer Kahf email] (noting that there is “agreement that current
accounts deposits” can be guaranteed by an Islamic Takaful insurer where the
Islamic bank “pays the insurance premium”).
81. SeeDiscussion Paper, supra note 78, at 5. (“Since losses are borne by the
PSIA holders, some have argued that PSIA holders should not enjoy protec-
tion.”). At least one system apparently excludes these deposits. See Blake
Goud, Islamic Finance Complexity (Part IIc), SHARING RISK (Nov. 20, 2011),
http://investhalal.blogspot.com/2011/11/islamic-finance-complexity-part-
iic.html (“Bahrain’s [law] covers deposits, not including mudaraba deposits or
other deposits not involving safekeeping or custodianship where the depositor
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can pose significant risks to the financial system. Most deposits
at Islamic banks are in participation accounts. Excluding them,
therefore, would leave much of the deposit base unprotected.82
This would reduce investor confidence and create systemic risk,
including the possibility of mass withdrawals.83
Some Islamic scholars have taken the position that the depos-
its can be insured but that the risk of loss must remain with the
account holders.84 Thus, premiums are to be paid at least in part
by account holders.85 In this manner, depositors are simply shar-
ing the risk of loss in a collective fashion. The deposit insurance
system in Sudan provides that the premium is collectively paid
by the account holder, the financial institution, and the central
bank.86 Each insures the portion of the risk of loss attributable
to their own behavior.
would be entitled to share in profits and losses.”). Britain allows for their ex-
clusion but leaves the choice to depositors. In chartering the Islamic Bank of
Britain, the deposit insurance systemwas altered to permit customers to waive
this protection. As a result, “[d]epositors who sign this waiver would not be
eligible to receive insurance of their deposit in accordance with Britain’s insur-
ance scheme.”Michael Silva, Islamic Banking Remarks, 12 L. & BUS. REV. AM.
201, 209 (2006).
82. They are the largest segment of deposits held by Islamic banks. See
Khnifer, supra note 20, at 21. (“The profit and loss sharing (PLS) or
Mudarabah forms the bulk of Islamic deposits.”).
83. Thus, the failure of an Islamic financial institution in Turkey resulted
in a loss of confidence for the entire segment and amassive withdrawal of funds
by depositors. See infra notes 153–58.
84. Prof. Dr. Monzer Kahf email, supra note 80 (noting that murabaha
based deposits “are not guaranteed and cannot be insured by the IB [Islamic
Bank]” but they can “be insured by owners (the depositors). The matter thus
centers on who pays the premium in addition to the Takaful and the avoidance
of interest issue.”).
85. Some systems address this concern by requiring that any premium for
insurance be paid from the returns allocated to investment accounts. See De-
posit Insurance for Islamic Banks, JORDAN DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
http://www.dic.gov.jo/index.php?option=com_con-
tent&task=view&id=90&Itemid=9 (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) [hereinafter
JORDANDEPOSIT INSURANCE] (“The Council reinforces the draft Law stipulating
that premium fees paid to the Corporation against insuring the credit accounts
shall be borne by the Islamic Banks, whereas the investment accounts’ annual
premium fees shall be borne by depositors with Islamic Banks.”).
86. Prof. Dr. Monzer Kahf email, supra note 80 (discussing deposit insur-
ance system in Sudan and noting that the demand deposit premium was paid
by Islamic banks while the premium for investment accounts was paid 50% by
depositors with investment accounts, through a deduction in their share of
profit, 25% by the Islamic Bank, for its potential responsibility in any banks
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Other scholars have attempted to devise a system that insures
participation accounts without contributions from depositors. In
Malaysia, banks, not depositors,87 pay the premium and, in re-
turn, receive a guarantee of repayment from a third party, the
Malaysian Deposit Insurance Corporation,88 under the principle
of kafalah bi al-ajr (guarantee with a fee).89 In the event of a
bank failure, deposits in participation accounts are given a lower
priority in the repayment hierarchy.90
Reliance on this structure is controversial. The problem is not
the guarantee, but the fee. Islamic law permits guarantees but
failure, and 25% by the central bank or ministry of finance, for their potential
role in any bank failure).
87. See Prof. Dr. Monzer Kahf email, supra note 80 (“In Malaysia a law was
enacted in 2005 with full premium charged” to the Islamic bank; “This is ob-
jected to by most Scholars in Malaysia and abroad.”).
88. Khnifer, supra note 20, at 24 (“Under the Mudharabah contract, the en-
trepreneur is not allowed to guarantee the principal amount of PLS accounts.
However, in 2003, Elgari issued a fatwa for the permissibility of such guaran-
tees as long as it came from an unrelated third party. After that, the Shariah
Advisory Council resolved that a third party guarantee is allowed to protect
Mudharabah investment accounts”).
89. See Bank Negara Malaysia, Shariah Resolutions in Islamic Finance:
Part IV: Shariah Issues in Relation to the Operations of Supporting Institu-
tions, in ISLAMIC FINANCE 175 (2d ed., 2010), http://www.bnm.gov.my/micro-
sites/financial/pdf/resolutions/10_part04.pdf. Malaysia originally structured
the system around tabarru and kafalah. Premiums were treated as a “dona-
tion” and the deposit insurance fund provided a guarantee. As one commenta-
tor noted, however, the concept of a “donation” suggested that there was no
legal obligation to make the payment. ABDUL KARIM ALDOHNI, THE LEGAL AND
REGULATORY ASPECTS OF ISLAMICBANKING 197 (2012).
90. Discussion Paper, supra note 78, at 13 (“Islamic deposits that are eligi-
ble to be insured include savings, demand and investment deposits accepted
under mudharabah (profit-sharing) and non-mudharabah contracts (e.g.
wadiah, qard, and murabahah). Participation interests, however, have lower
priority in the repayment hierarchy. See id. at 14 (“respect of Islamic deposits,
the priority of payments is based on the underlying contracts of the deposits,
whereby non-mudharabah deposits are given priority over mudharabah depos-
its.”).
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considers them an act of benevolence.91 As a result, the guaran-
tor is generally not entitled to charge for the service.92Moreover,
some have noted that the guarantee for a fee approach creates a
system that is largely indistinguishable from traditional deposit
insurance.93
Other countries eschew the use of guarantees and instead rely
on takaful, or self-insurance.94 The concept of takaful allows par-
ticipants to pool their funds under a system of mutual guaran-
tee.95 Takaful is not intended to be a commercial endeavor but
an agreement among participants of cooperation in the sharing
of risks. Premiums are considered a donation (tabarru) to a
91. See id. at 11 (“There is an ongoing debate about the adoption of the guar-
antee contract in any financial transaction, owing to the existence of the fee
element in the contract. On the one hand, a number of classical Shariah schol-
ars are of the view that charging a fee for a guarantee is not allowed, based on
the argument that the contract is voluntary in nature. On the other hand, some
Shariah scholars recognize the need to allow it, based on the current needs of
the community.”). See also HANDBOOK OF ISLAMIC BANKING, supra note 21, at
156 (“Although some Islamic banks also use commercial guarantees, the gen-
eral fiqh understanding goes against their use. In accordance with the fiqh only
a third party can provide guarantees as a benevolent act and on the basis of a
service charge for actual expenses. Owing to this lack of consensus, therefore,
the tool is not effectively used in the Islamic banking industry.”).
92. AZMAN MOHD NOOR & MUHAMAD NASIR HARON, CHARGING FEE FOR
GUARANTEE (AL-KAFALAH BI AL-AJR) AND ITSAPPLICATION BYDEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION MALAYSIA (PIDM) FOR TAKAFUL BENEFITS PROTECTION SCHEME
(2011), http://conference.qfis.edu.qa/app/media/316 (“The great majority of Is-
lamic jurists have always considered it unlawful to charge a fee for a guaran-
tee. They are the jurists from Hanafites, Shafiites, Malikites and also Han-
balites who claimed that it is unlawful to charge fee against a guarantee. They
hold that it is permissible to give guarantee; however, to take any rewards from
it is prohibited.”).
93. Id. at 13 (“But as far as Shariah compliance is concern, the structure of
kafalah bi al-ajr contract perhaps needs reconsideration since it may look like
conventional insurance model.”).
94. See Discussion Paper, supra note 78, at 14 (“To ensure a Shariah-com-
pliant system, BDSF [Bank Deposit Security Fund of Sudan] adopted the taka-
ful contract for its deposit insurance.”). By characterizing the contribution as
a donation, the product also avoids the prohibition on gharar. See Oliver Agha,
Tabarru in Takaful: Helpful Innovation or Unnecessary Complication?, 9
UCLAJ. ISLAMIC&NEARE.L. 69, 83 (2009-2010) (“The incorporation of tabarru
is intended to circumvent the absolute prohibition on gharar in commercial
and commutative contracts by making it a unilateral donation and not in fact
a bilateral contract.”).
95. For a criticism of the use of takaful in place of insurance, see Hamoudi,
supra note 17, at 122–23. For a discussion of takaful, see Agha, supra note 94.
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pool.96 The pool is managed by an operator who acts as an agent
for the participants and provides compensation to depositors
whenever a bank fails.97
This approach also raises concerns under Sharia. First, as a
“donation,” premiums generally must be paid without the expec-
tation of any specific return.98 Islamic banks, however, antici-
pate repayment to depositors in the event of a failure. As a re-
sult, the motive is not entirely charitable but “conditional,” a
practice that is arguably inconsistent with the “fundamental ob-
jective of tabarru.”99
Second, takaful suggests voluntary participation.100 Insuring
the integrity of the financial system may, however, dictate that
participation be mandatory. Jordan, which created a system of
96. NOOR &HARON, supra note 92, at 13 (“The takaful benefit is actually a
mutual guarantee and indemnity made by the participants among themselves.
The strength lies in their agreement and promise as stated in the takaful con-
tract to provide the financial assistance to the participating members during
misfortune.”).
97. Discussion Paper, supra note 78, at 11 (“Under an IDIS that operates
based on the donation contract, an IBI agrees to pay premiums in the form of
donations or voluntary contributions to a fund (deposit insurance fund). The
deposit insurer, acting as manager of the fund, will use the fund to reimburse
depositors of any IBI that suffers a failure.”).
98. Agha, supra note 94 (“Once a donation is made there can be no expecta-
tion of return.”).
99. See Asyraf Wajdi Dusuki, Revisit The Principle of Tabarru’ in Takaful
Structure, ASYRAFWAJDI (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.asyrafwajdi.com/in-
dex.php/home/k2-categories/item/20-revisit-principle-tabarru-takaful-struc-
ture (“[T]he tabarru is not merely for charity but conditional upon certain con-
sideration, namely the right to claim takaful benefits in the event of loss. With-
out such a right, he will neither participate nor perform the tabarru’. This is
deemed to be a violation of the fundamental objective of tabarru.’”) (emphasis
added).
100. Discussion Paper, supra note 78, at 11 (“Donating (tabarru’) is defined
as the voluntary transfer of an asset or its usufruct from one party to another
without stipulating any counter value . . . . This contract is suitable for a de-
posit insurance system in which membership is not mandatory.”).
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insurance premised upon takaful,101 originally made participa-
tion voluntary,102 with the result that no Islamic banks joined.103
The government has since proposed making participation man-
datory104 on the basis ofMaslahah’ameh or the public interest.105
Third, the operator of the deposit insurance system will pay
depositors in the event of a failed bank in accordance with in-
structions from participants in the insurance scheme.106 None-
theless, as a gift, the operator in theory has discretion over the
use of the funds.107 To the extent that payments do not occur,
101. Jordan also has a system based upon takaful. See JORDAN DEPOSIT
INSURANCE, supra note 85.
102. See LAW NO. 33, art. 3(b) (2000) (Jordan), available at
http://www.dic.gov.jo/index.php?option=com_con-
tent&task=view&id=13&Itemid=17 (deposit insurance does not apply to “Is-
lamic banks licensed to operate in the Kingdom, unless any one of them decides
to join the Corporation in order to insure the deposits held by it.”).
103. Announcement by JumanaHamed, Dir. Gen., Jordan Deposit Ins. Corp.,
to IADI Participants, http://www.iadi.org/docs/Announcement_JODIC.pdf
(last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
104. The Cabinet Approved the Draft of the Amended JODIC’s Law, JORDAN
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, http://www.dic.gov.jo/index.php?op-
tion=com_content&task=view&id=96&Itemid=9 (last visited Feb. 16, 2015)
[hereinafter JODIC].
105. Under the Jordanian system, the insurance fund is considered to have
been created by donation (tabarru) and managed as an agreement based on
cost (“Wakalah bil Ujrah”). See INT’L ASSOC. DEPOSIT INSURERS, Shari’ah Ap-
proaches for the Implementation of Islamic Deposit Insurance Systems (Islamic
Deposit Insurance Group of the International Association of Deposit Insurers,
Discussion Paper, 2014), http://www.iadi.org/docs/Shariah_Ap-
proaches_for_IDIS-for-publication-Nov_2014-FINAL.pdf
106. See Agha, supra note 94, at 84 (“The participants in the insurance plan
agree to make contributions to a common fund for the purpose of mutual sup-
port. They also promise that a gift from the fund will be made to contributors
who suffer certain specified losses.”). See also Mark Cammack, Islamic Fi-
nance: Prospects and Significance, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 113, 120 (2011) (“The par-
ticipants in the insurance plan agree to make contributions to a common fund
for the purpose of mutual support. They also promise that a gift from the fund
will be made to contributors who suffer certain specified losses. The funds paid
into the plan are managed and invested by an insurance company. The com-
pany pays claims according to the promises made by the participants.”).
107. See Agha, supra note 94, at 84 (“The prohibition on conditional tabarru
means that the operator would have free and unfettered discretion in the op-
eration of the takaful fund.”).
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issues of enforcement may arise, creating uncertainty and po-
tentially raising concerns among depositors.108 Indeed, this was
one of the reasons Malaysia rejected the approach in devising its
scheme of insurance.109
C. Deposit Insurance and Riba
Islamic compliant deposit insurance must meet other obliga-
tions under Sharia. In particular, the system must be interest
free. The premiums paid by Islamic banks cannot be invested in
interest bearing instruments.110 This requires that premiums
from Islamic and traditional commercial banks be segregated,111
with the former invested in a Sharia compliant manner.112
Likewise funds generated from the payment of interest cannot
be used to bail out a failed Islamic bank. A deposit insurance
corporation cannot, therefore, rely on funds from commercial
108. See id. (“Once a donation is made there can be no expectation of return.
Therefore, there are critical issues of enforceability of the tabarru structure
under a rigorous and legalistic shari’a analysis.”).
109. Khnifer, supra note 20, at 22. (“[T]he MDIC stressed that Tabarru’
might not be sufficient to convince central banks that Islamic institutions could
provide a guarantee as a voluntary rather than an obligatory act.”).
110. The prohibition applies to any kind of transaction involving interest.
They can arise in a number of circumstances. See Discussion Paper, supra note
78, at 7 (“The interest element could also exist in deposit insurance when the
deposit insurer is involved in interest-based transactions or activities. This can
happen when the deposit insurer protects deposits, invests the deposit insur-
ance funds, lends to troubled banks, and obtains external funds (when in defi-
cit), in which all these activities are based on interest.”).
111. See SHARIAH ADVOCACY COUNCIL, supra note 80 (“[T]here is a need to
separate the funds in the operation of deposit insurance scheme for Islamic
banking to ensure that the fund of Islamic deposit insurance scheme are in-
vested in Shariah compliant instrument.”). See also id. (“Nevertheless, there
is a need to separate the funds in the operation of deposit insurance scheme
for Islamic banking to ensure that the fund of Islamic deposit insurance
scheme are invested in Shariah compliant instrument.”).
112. They also cannot be invested in businesses that engage in sinful activi-
ties. See Discussion Paper, supra note 78, at 8 (“In addition to interest, uncer-
tainty and gambling, Shariah also does not allow certain other elements to
exist in a deposit insurance system. For instance, the deposit insurance fund
must not be used for the purchase of liquor and pork, or for any activities that
are prohibited under Shariah.”).
434 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:2
banks—including any investment income—in repaying deposi-
tors of an Islamic financial institution.113 To the extent, there-
fore, that the Islamic banks represent only a small portion of the
financial system, the funds available in the event of a failure
may be very modest and inadequate to repay all depositors.114
Malaysia structured its system of deposit insurance to meet
these principles. Premiums from Islamic banks are segregated115
and can only be invested in Sharia compliant instruments.116 In
the event that these funds prove insufficient to repay depositors
from a failed Islamic bank, the deposit insurance fund is prohib-
ited from using premiums from commercial banks andmust seek
additional amounts from the market or the government.117
113. The investment issue can be avoided through a system that collects pre-
miums only after a failure has occurred. Bahrain has used this type of system.
See Goud, supra note 81 (noting that the system in Bahrain is “post-funded
(i.e., deposit insurance assessments are only collected from banks when there
is a failure), so there are no issues with how the deposit insurance premiums
are invested (although the CBB website does indicate that a new deposit in-
surance program is under construction that would shift it to being pre-funded
raising the issue of investing the premiums collected by the Central Bank).”).
Nonetheless, the country is likely to abandon the approach. See Blake Goud,
Bahrain Changing Its Deposit Insurance Fund, SHARING RISK (Nov. 6, 2012),
http://investhalal.blogspot.com/2012/11/bahrain-changing-its-deposit-insur-
ance.html (discussing an initiative in Bahrain to create a prefunded system of
deposit insurance).
114. Issues can also arise with respect to the disposition of funds in a deposit
insurance system that undergoes liquidation. The fatwa approving the deposit
insurance system in Jordan mandated that, in the event of liquidation of the
fund, “the outstanding balance shall revert to Zakat Fund at the Ministry of
Awqaf, Islamic Affairs and Holy Places.” JORDAN DEPOSIT INSURANCE, supra
note 85.
115. Discussion Paper, supra note 78, at 2 (“Both [Islamic and commercial]
systems [of deposit insurance] are administered under one roof by theMalaysia
Deposit Insurance Corporation, which was given the mandate pursuant to the
Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation Act 2005.”). See also INT’LMONETARY
FUND, IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 13/60, MALAYSIA: PUBLICATION OF FINANCIAL
SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION—DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF
OBSERVANCE OF CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEMS
6 (Mar. 2013) (“The funds for conventional and Islamic deposits are separately
administered with the Islamic deposit insurance fund administered in accord-
ance with Shariah principles.”).
116. See Discussion Paper, supra note 78, at 13 (“MDIC is required to invest
in Shariah-compliant instruments.”).
117. See id. at 14 (“In the event of a shortfall in the Islamic fund, MDIC would
use the credit line from the government or funding from the market, which
would be structured in a Shari’ah-compliant fashion.”). See alsoKhnifer, supra
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These requirements can, however, raise concerns. Efforts to
invest premiums from Islamic banks in a Sharia compliant man-
ner may confront an insufficient supply of acceptable instru-
ments.118 Moreover, segregating premiums from Islamic and
commercial banks can create systemic risks by reducing the
funds available in the event of a bank failure.
D. Observations
Sharia scholars generally agree that deposit insurance is per-
missible. Nonetheless, Sharia imposes a number of require-
ments that affect the applicable structure. As a result, govern-
ments creating compliant systems of deposit insurance confront
serious choices. They can rely on approaches that conform to
Sharia, but also raise the possibility of systemic risk. A system,
for example, that excluded deposits in participation accounts
would in some cases provide these depositors with an incentive
to withdraw funds when concerns arose over the solvency of the
financial institution, something that could result in runs on the
bank. This occurred in Turkey in 2001.119
The difficulties associated with an Islamic system of deposit
insurance may explain their relative rarity. Only Malaysia and
Sudan have such systems in place,120 with Jordan likely to be-
come a third.121 Other Islamic countries have deposit insurance
note 20, at 27 (“Payments in the event of the failure of member institutions are
similarly separated and no transfer of funds between the IDI and conventional
IDI are permitted. Instead, MDIC is statutorily permitted to increase funding
from the government should there be a need.”).
118. Discussion Paper supra note 77, at 16 (“[D]eposit insurers face difficul-
ties in investing surplus deposit insurance funds, as there are limited Islamic
instruments.”).
119. See infra note 153–58.
120. Discussion Paper, supra note 78 (“Currently, only Malaysia and Sudan
have set up an IDIS, while some other countries provide protection for Islamic
deposits under their conventional systems.”).
121. Jordan permits Islamic banks to join voluntarily the deposit insurance
scheme. See LAW NO. 33, art. 3(b) (2000) (Jordan), available at
http://www.dic.gov.jo/index.php?option=com_con-
tent&task=view&id=13&Itemid=17. There are proposals, however, to make
the system mandatory. See JODIC, supra note 104,
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systems122 but rely on conventional systems that do not appear
to be Sharia compliant.123
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC BANKS IN TURKEY
A. Early Development
The Republic of Turkey arose out of the ruins of the Ottoman
Empire. In establishing a republic, Ataturk deliberately sought
to reduce the public influence of Islam. He did so through the
implementation of a strategy of laicism. Laicism entailed not so
much a separation of mosque and state but the establishment of
government hegemony over religion.
Under the approach, the Caliphate was abolished,124 religious
schools and mosques were subjected to government control, and
122. Discussion Paper, supra note 78, at 4 (“Other countries that also provide
protection for Islamic deposits include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jordan, Ku-
wait, Singapore and the United Kingdom. These countries (except Jordan) use
the model that protects Islamic deposits under the country’s conventional de-
posit insurance system.”).
123. See Discussion Paper, supra note 78, at 3 (“Also in 2005, Indonesia in-
troduced protection for Islamic deposits under the Indonesia Deposit Insurance
Corporation Act 2004. Similar to Turkey, Islamic and conventional deposits in
Indonesia are protected under a conventional deposit insurance system, which
is administered by the Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC).”). See
alsoMohammed Khnifer, Featured Structure: Towards a Universal Islamic De-
posit Insurance System, USNAZRI (Dec. 16, 2010), http://usnazri.blog-
spot.com/2010/12/featured-structure-towards-universal.html. (“Indonesia has
one pool where all the premiums and returns out of purchasing securities are
mixed. Hence, the paid capital of the IDI fund has been contaminated with
conventional funds.”).
124. See HAYDAR KAZGAN, ET. AL., 2 TURKISH FINANCIAL HISTORY, FROM THE
OTTOMANEMPIRE TO THE PRESENT 9 (1999) (the last Caliphate was Abdulmecit
Efendi).
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imams became employees of the state.125 The Latin alphabet re-
placed Arabic script126 and a secular civil code was introduced.127
Under Ataturk, the financial system was guided, not by prin-
ciples of Sharia, but the philosophy of statism.128 Banks were
mostly used as conduits to finance the industrial policy promoted
by the government. A closed, inward-looking system, wherein
foreign banks were marginalized or eliminated129 and interest
rates were set at uncompetitive rates,130 effectively limited the
size of the financial system and the funds available for lend-
ing.131
125. Oktem, supra note 2, at 387 (“The DI[B] appoints religious officials, in-
cluding imams, pays the stipends of religious officials, and directs the admin-
istration of more than 70,000 mosques.”). They are regulated by the Diyanet
İşleri Başkanliği, or Directorate of Religious Affairs. See ANGEL RABASA & F.
STEPHEN LARRABEE, RAND CORP., THE RISE OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY 11–
12 (2008), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG726.pdf.
126. Use of the Arabic script became illegal on January 1, 1929. Even fashion
was unable to escape Ataturk’s reforming zeal. The Hat Law banned the fez,
promoting the use of western clothing styles, and the veil was discouraged.
Surnames were introduced. See Benjamin D. Bleiberg, Unveiling the Real Is-
sue: Evaluating the European Court of Human Rights’ Decision to Enforce the
Turkish Headscarf Ban in Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, 91 CORNELLL.REV. 129, 134–
35 (2005).
127. The Code was largely borrowed from Switzerland. For a discussion of
the decision to adopt the Swiss Code, rather than the one in place in France
and Germany, see Arzu Oguz, The Role of Comparative Law in the Develop-
ment of Turkish Civil Law, 17 PACE INT’L L. REV. 373, 380–82 (2005). A new
code was adopted in 2002. Id. at 385.
128. The absence of Islamic influences was also apparent during the Ottoman
period. See SEVKET PAMUK, THE EVOLUTION OF FACTOR MARKETS IN THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1500-1800, at 18 (2005), http://www.iisg.nl/hpw/pa-
pers/pamuk05.pdf. (“Neither the Islamic prohibitions against interest and
usury nor the absence of formal banking institutions prevented the expansion
of credit in Ottoman society.”).
129. See DERYA GULTEKIN-KARAKAS, GLOBAL INTEGRATION OF TURKISH
FINANCIAL CAPITAL 72 (2009) (noting that, between 1924 and 1945, foreign
banks share of deposits fell from 78% to 19%).
130. See id. at 78 (noting that “almost all private deposit banks became sub-
ject to the control of certain conglomerates”). By paying negative interest rates,
deposits were a cheap source of funding that could be lent profitably to these
industrial complexes. Id. at 80.
131. The approach provided an incentive to expand branch networks in order
to maximize the deposit base. See CEVDETDENIZER, THEEFFECTS OF FINANCIAL
LIBERALIZATION AND NEW BANK ENTRY ON MARKET STRUCTURE AND
COMPETITION IN TURKEY (1997), http://www.econturk.org/Turkishecon-
omy/wbank3.pdf (“Rising inflation during the late 1960s and throughout the
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The financial and political crisis of 1979 largely brought an end
to these inward-looking policies. The government sought to en-
courage economic growth by attracting additional funds into the
financial system, whether domestic deposits or foreign capital.
Controls on interest rates were loosened and eventually elimi-
nated and, for the first time, the government provided a role for
Islamic banks in the Turkish financial markets.132
B. The Introduction of Islamic Banks into Turkey
Within days of taking office in 1983, Prime Minister Ozal al-
lowed the opening of Islamic financial institutions.133 Ozal was
motivated, at least in part, by a desire to attract capital into the
financial system. Islamic banks could generate additional do-
mestic deposits, particularly from those motivated by religious
beliefs,134 and foreign investment, particularly from the Middle
East.135
Ozal’s intuition proved accurate. In addition to attracting reli-
gious based depositors, the first three Islamic banks, Al Baraka
1970s also provided another strong incentive [for] banks to expand their
branch networks. With interest rates becoming increasingly negative in real
terms, opening new branches to collect deposits and investing them into real
assets was highly profitable. In fact, as deposit rates became increasingly neg-
ative in real terms, the number of branches of both public and private banks
increased.”).
132. See TURKEY: A BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT REVIEW 28 (Marat Terterov &
Philip Rosenblatt eds., 2006).
133. The decree was adopted three days after Turgut Ozal became primemin-
ister, replacing Bulent Ulusu, the prime minister appointed after the military
coup in 1980. See YENER ALTUNBAS, ALPER KARA & OZLEM OLGU, TURKISH
BANKING 33 (2009).
134. The banks might induce the religiously conservative to deposit funds
otherwise kept in the proverbial “mattress.” Filis Baskan, The Political Econ-
omy of Islamic Finance in Turkey: The Role of Fethullah Gülen and Asya Fi-
nans, in THE POLITICS OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 225 (Henry, C. M. and Wilson, R.
eds., 2004) (“A third motive was to attract the savings of conservative people
into the Turkish economy.”). These may not have been the only motivations.
Id. at 225 (noting that Ozal “may have had a personal interest” in the financial
institutions since two of them apparently had some connection to his brother).
135. Id. (“Second, it is claimed that the main aim of the special finance houses
was to attract capital from Gulf countries to Turkey.”).
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Finance House,136 Faisal Finance House,137 and Kuveyt Finance
House,138 received funding primarily from foreign sources. Only
in the 1990s would domestic sources fund finance houses, includ-
ing Anadolu Finans in 1991,139 Ihlas Finans in 1994,140 and Asya
Finans in 1996.141
136. Al Baraka formed in 1985. See Ayse Yuce, Islamic Financial Houses in
Turkey, 1 J. ACAD. BUS. &ECON., 153, 155 (2003). The bank was founded by the
Albaraka Banking Group based in Bahrain. The shareholders consist of Al-
baraka Banking Group, 54 percent, the Islamic Development Bank, 7.84 per-
cent, and the Alharthy Family, 3.46 percent. There were some Turkish share-
holders, however. See Liam Hardy, The Evolution of Participation Banking in
Turkey, AL NAKHLAH 1, 6 (Winter 2012), http://fletcher.tufts.edu/~/me-
dia/Fletcher/Microsites/al%20Nakhlah/archives/Winter2012/Hardy_Final.pdf
(While 11.4% comes from local Turkish investors, nearly 22.5% is publicly
traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange.”).
137. The financial institution incorporated in October, 1984, with 5 billion
TRY contributed by Prince Muhammad al-Faisal al-Saud. MUHAMMAD AKRAM
KHAN, ISLAMIC ECONOMICS AND FINANCE: A GLOSSARY 59 (2004). About 10 per-
cent of the capital came from Turkish investors. See Yuce, supra note 136, at
155.
138. Kuveyt Finance House was formed in 1989. See KUVEYT TURK
PARTICIPATION BANK ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 9 (2009),
http://www.kuveytturk.com.tr/pdf/financial_information/annualre-
ports/2009_Annual_Report.pdf (“In accordance with the authorization issued
by the Turkish Central Bank on February 28, 1989, Kuveyt Turk Katilim Ban-
kasi A.S. began banking and finance operations on March 31, 1989.”). Accord-
ing to the 2009 annual report, the Kuwait Finance House held slightly more
than 62 percent of the shares, with the Kuwait Social Security Institution and
Islamic Development Bank each holding 9 percent. The Directorate General of
Foundations of Turkey owned 19 percent. Id. at 9.
139. Turkiye Finance Prospectus, U.S. $500,000,000 Certificates due 2018, at
74 (April 30, 2013), http://www.centralbank.ie/regulation/securities-mar-
kets/prospectus/Lists/ProspectusDocuments/Attachments/15534/Prospec-
tus%20-%20Standalone%20-%20302623.PDF (noting that Anadolu Finans Ku-
rumu A.Ş “obtained permission from the Central Bank of Turkey on 24 October
1991 and commenced operations on 4 November 1991.”).
140. IHLASFINANS, CORPORATEPROFILE, REPORT OF THELIQUIDATIONBOARD 5
(2008), http://www.ifk.com.tr/2008-operating-period-ROTLB.pdf.
141. See BANKASYA, ASYASUKUKCOMPANYLIMITED, U.S. $250,000,000 FIXED
RATE RESETTABLE TIER 2 CERTIFICATES DUE 2023 ISSUE PRICE: 100 PER CENT 84
(Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.centralbank.ie/regulation/securities-markets/pro-
spectus/Lists/ProspectusDocuments/Attachments/15221/Prospectus%20-
%20Standalone%20302454.PDF [hereinafter ASYA SUKUK PROSPECTUS] (not-
ing that Bank Asya was incorporated as Asya Finans Kuruma A.S ̧ “as a joint
stock company on 24 October 1996 pursuant to the decree of the Council of
Ministers No. 96/8041 on 11 April 1996 and as published in the Official Gazette
on 25 April 1996.”). Faisal Finance became domestically owned when it was
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Initially dubbed “finance houses,” these intermediaries intro-
duced a different model of banking into the Turkish system. In-
terest was not paid on deposits or charged on loans. Instead, de-
posits were invested, primarily into transactions based upon
principles of mark ups (murabaha) and leasing (ijhara).142 A por-
tion of the profits were allocated to depositors based upon a for-
mula set by the finance houses. The short term nature of the
loans,143 the standard split in profit and loss,144 and the presence
of security,145 made the returns generally safe and largely pre-
dictable.
Although allowed into Turkey, the Islamic finance houses were
subjected to significant restraints. They incurred political hos-
tility146 and their regulatory status was left uncertain.147 They
purchased by Kombassan Holding, a Turkish holding company, in 1998. See
infra note 159.
142. Durmus Yilmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Tur-
key, Opening Speech at Conference on Islamic Finance: During and After the
Global Financial Crisis (Oct. 5, 2009), http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/con-
nect/TCMB+EN/TCMB+EN/Main+Menu/Announcements/Remarks+by+Gove
rnor/2009/gov-1 (“Participation banks in Turkey mainly offer two types of lend-
ing. The first type of financing is Murabaha, which is a transaction consisting
of two sales contracts . . . . The second type of financing is financial leasing or
Ijhara, with terms similar to those offered by other leasing companies.”).
143. See Wassim Rajhi & Slim Ahmed Hassairi, Unconventional Banking
System in Distress, 3 INT’L J.ECON. &FIN. 70, 76 (2011) (“SFH held 90% of their
assets in short-term facilities (typically four to five months in duration) pro-
vided notably to small and medium-size companies. This sort of financing was
extended in the form of murabaha.”).
144. See MARTHA STARR & RASIM YILMAZ, BANK RUNS IN EMERGING-MARKET
COUNTRIES: THEEXPERIENCE OF TURKEY’S ISLAMICBANKS IN THE 2001 CRISIS 4–
5 (Feb. 11, 2005), http://www.luc.edu/orgs/meea/volume7/starr.pdf (“The SFH
keeps 20% of income from lending activities and 80% is distributed to ac-
countholders.”). See also supra note 18.
145. STARR & YILMAZ, supra note 144 (“The main use of funds by SFHs is
short-term loans (typically 4-5 months in duration) provided to small- and me-
dium-sized companies needing capital. . . . This sort of financing . . . represents
90% of the SFH’s total use of funds; . . . the concentration of lending in this
low-risk form implies that returns, if not guaranteed, are highly predictable”).
146. Id., at 5 (noting that the finance houses “had variable political support
and were periodically threatened with closure by critics in Parliament for their
blending of religion and business”).
147. The financial institutions were allowed into the country under a decree
of the council of ministers. See Decree No. 83/7506, (Dec. 16, 1983) (Turk.); see
also RODNEY WILSON, ISLAMIC FINANCIAL MARKET 38 (2012). A decree issued
could just as easily be revoked. Legislation confirming the status of these fi-
nancial institutions would only be adopted in 1999.
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could not advertise their religious affiliation. Products were not
Sharia compliant but “interest-free.”148 Informal restrictions
limited the size of their branch network, preventing expansion
and reducing the ability to attract deposits.
Legislation adopted in 1999 sought to bring the finance houses
more completely into the banking system.149 Integration, how-
ever, was incomplete. Finance houses were not made part of the
system of deposit insurance150 but merely given the right to cre-
ate one of their own.151 Likewise, the absence of Islamic compli-
ant securities issued by the Turkish government deprived fi-
nance houses of a critical source of liquidity.152
These structural weaknesses became apparent in 2001 with
the collapse of Ihlas, the largest of the finance houses.153 The ab-
sence of insurance meant that depositors could not immediately
148. There was also some uncertainty about the degree of compliance with
Sharia. See Market Share of Participant Banks on the Rise in Turkey, TODAY’S
ZAMAN (May 8, 2011, 12:42 PM), http://www.todayszaman.com/news-243159-
market-share-of-participation-banks-on-the-rise-in-turkey.html (“Participa-
tion banks in Turkey were initially suspected by some of not really operating
on completely interest-free terms.”).
149. See Rajhi & Hassairi, supra note 143 (“Although SFHs were initially
governed by a separate regulatory framework from that applying to conven-
tional banks, the 1999 bank law brought them under the same regulatory um-
brella. They were required to meet the same minimum capitalization as con-
ventional banks, the same required reserve ratios, and the same liquidity ra-
tios. SFH had similar reporting requirements to the central bank as commer-
cial banks, notably on foreign-currency positions.”).
150. Id. (“However, SFH were not covered by deposit insurance, with the ra-
tionale that profit-and-loss accounts involved no guarantee of return of princi-
pal to be Sharia compliant. Also unlike commercial banks, a failed SFH would
not be transferred to the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund for reconciliation.”).
151. The Banking Act gave to the Association of Special Finance Houses the
authority to create and manage the insurance system for the Islamic banks.
See Banks Act No. 4389, 18.6.1999, art. 20-1(6) and Act No. 4672, provisional
art. 2(b) (Turk.), reprinted at http://www.bddk.org.tr/websitesi/english/Legisla-
tion/63671889banks_act_4389.pdf. At least one commentator suggested that
this was designed to ensure conformity with Islamic practices. See STARR &
YILMAZ supra note 144, at 7 (“the Special Finance Houses were not covered by
deposit insurance, with the rationale that profit-and-loss accounts involved no
guarantee of return of principal”).
152. See Hardy, supra note 136, at 4. (“Because the deposits of Ihlas Finans
were not protected by the Central Bank’s insurance system, and Ihlas could
not invest in government securities, a major proportion of the investments
were in illiquid assets and projects.”).
153. Ihlas had almost 40% of the deposits held by the finance houses. See
STARR & YILMAZ, supra note 144, at 5. See also Rajhi & Hassairi, supra note
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recover their funds.154 The failure caused a run on the other Is-
lamic banks155 and the withdrawal of a majority of the depos-
its,156 nearly causing the segment to collapse.157
With the collapse of Ihlas, five finance houses remained: Al
Baraka Türk, Asya, Kuveyt Turk, Anatolia Finans, and Family
Finans, the successor to Faisal Finance. That number would fall
to four in 2005, when Anadolu Finans and Family Finans
merged, forming Turkiye Finans.158 That financial institution
would eventually be acquired by the National Commercial
143 (“Ihlas Finance House (IFH) was Turkey’s largest SFH with close to 38%
of the total deposits collected by the six SFH at the end of 2000.”).
154. The liquidation of Ihlas would drag on, with current account holders not
entirely repaid until 2007 and at least some participation account holders still
unpaid in 2012. The payout schedule can be found here:
http://www.ifk.com.tr/detay.asp?ContentID=749&lang=eng. Participation ac-
counts were fourth in line for repayment after amounts owed to the govern-
ment, employees and current account holders. See Payment Plan, IHLAS
FINANS, http://www.ifk.com.tr/detay.asp?ContentID=747&lang=eng (last vis-
ited Nov. 10, 2014).
155. See ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD, supra note 20, at 122. (“That
Islamic banks are not immune to contagion effects became apparent in the
2001 run on the participation banks (at that time called “special finance
houses”) in Turkey.”).
156. Sixty-three percent of all deposits exited, although the percentage is a
less dramatic 36% when Ihlas was excluded. See Conference Report, Ahmet
Erturk, Islamic Banking: Case Study of Turkey, 6th IADI Annual Conference,
slide 5 (Nov. 1–2, 2007), http://www.scribd.com/doc/6340565/Islamic-Banking-
Case-of-Turkey-. This was true despite the fact that participation accounts
were time deposits and not susceptible to immediate withdraw. See also Rajhi
& Hassairi, supra note 143 (“Many depositors sought to withdraw their funds
before maturity, and initially the SFHs accommodated such requests. But as
the runs continued, some had to restrict early withdrawals.”).
157. In addition, the acquisition of Faisal Finans by Ülker, a Turkish con-
glomerate, apparently staved off another collapse. See Hardy, supra note 136,
at 4 (“The crisis had a major negative effect on the entire banking sector, and
the participation banks also suffered. Turkish holding company Ülker pur-
chased Faisal Finans in 2000, changing its name to Family Finance House.”).
158. See PAUL WOULTERS, TURKEY 2005: “CROSSING THE BOSPORUS” 60 (Is-
lamic Fin. News Guide 2006), http://www.islamicfinan-
cenews.com/guidepdf/Turkey_2005.pdf. (“In December 2005, the voluntary
merger of Family Finans Kurumu and Anadolu Finans Kurumu into the Tü-
rkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi was announced, thereby creating the largest
participation bank in Turkey.”).
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Bank of Saudi Arabia,159 leaving Asya as the only finance house
majority owned by Turkish investors.
The crisis demonstrated the risks arising from the exclusion of
the Islamic financial institutions from the system of deposit in-
surance. Reforms adopted in 1999 had given the entities the au-
thority to set up their own system of deposit insurance. The au-
thority, however, remained dormant until the collapse of Ihlas
in 2001.
Thereafter, the finance houses used the authority to create a
system that was arguably interest free and Sharia compliant.160
The trade association for the finance houses managed the assets,
effectively segregating them from the commercial banks. Insol-
vencies were to be handled by the same fund, avoiding the use
of premiums paid by commercial banks.161 Limited to premiums
from the Islamic banks, however, the system had a reduced pool
of funds available in the event of any future bailout.
159. Turkiye Finance Prospectus, supra note 139, at 5. The Ulker Group pur-
chased Faisal Finance in 2001 from Kombassan Holding at a time when the
Islamic bank looked like a possible candidate to fail. The gamble turned out to
be a good one. In 2008, 60 percent of the bank’s shares were acquired by The
National Commercial Bank, the largest bank in Saudi Arabia. WOULTERS, su-
pra note 158. Ulker sold a portion of its shares in the bank for $600 million,
while retaining a minority interest in the participation bank. ISMAIL
YURDAKOK, CULTURE OF ISLAMIC ECONOMICS IN TURKEY 163, 173, available at
http://www.kantakji.com/fiqh/Files/Research/op48.pdf (last visited Mar. 31,
2015); see also Bibd Marks Milestone With Türkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi In
A Usd75m Murabaha Financing Facility, BIBD, http://www.bibd.com.bn/in-
dex.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=231:bibd-marks-milestone-
with-tuerkye-fnans-katilim-bankasi-in-a-usd75m-murabaha-financing-facil-
ity&catid=39:general-news&Itemid=73 (last visited Nov. 10, 2014) (noting
that Turkiye Finans was owned 64.68% by NCB, 21.36% by the Boydak Group,
and 13.79% by the Ülker Group).
160. Sefer Yuksel, Turkey at the Crossroads-Islamic Banks Resist Central
Bank Sin, SHARIAH FINANCE WATCH (July 7, 2008), http://www.Shari-
ahfinancewatch.org/blog/2008/07/07/turkey-at-the-crossroads-islamic-banks-
resist-central-bank-sin/ (noting that the “liquidation of a participation bank
whose authorization of operation is withdrawn should be carried out by a com-
mittee of liquidation to be appointed by the Participation Banks Association”).
161. Discussion Paper, supra note 78, at 2 (“In 2001, Turkey developed an
IDIS that operated alongside the conventional system—the first country to es-
tablish a dual deposit insurance system. Unlike the conventional system,
which was administered by the government, the IDIS was administered by
Participation Banks of Turkey to protect Islamic deposits in participation
banks”).
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C. Islamic Banks and the AKP
The rise of an Islamic oriented government in 2002 altered the
environment for the finance houses.162 Under the leadership of
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Party tested the traditional bounda-
ries of secularism. Erdogan engineered a repeal of the ban on
headscarves on university campuses,163 restricted the sale of al-
cohol,164 and instituted a foreign policy that tilted toward Islamic
162. Although the AKP won just 34 percent of the vote, only one other party
obtained the 10 percent threshold needed to be represented in the Parliament.
As a result, AKP received about two thirds of the seats, with the remainder
assigned to the Republican People’s Party. See Soner Cagaptay, The November
2002 Elections and Turkey’s New Political Era, 6 MIDDLE EAST REV. OF INT’L
AFFAIRS 42 (2002), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Docu-
ments/opeds/4225defa40e83.pdf
163. The policy was, struck down by the Constitutional Court. SeeGunesMu-
rat Tezcur, Judicial Activism in Perilous Times: The Turkish Case, 43 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 305, 310 (2009) (“The Court also vetoed a piece of parliamentary
legislation that would revoke the ban on headscarves on university campuses
in June, 2008.”). Only in 2013 did a partial repeal of the ban go into effect. See
Roff Smith, Why Turkey Lifted Its Ban on the Islamic Headscarf, NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 11, 2013), http://news.nationalgeo-
graphic.com/news/2013/10/131011-hijab-ban-turkey-islamic-headscarf-
ataturk/.
164. The government, however, disclaimed any religious motivation. See Ci-
nar Kiper, Muslim Light: What’s Behind Turkey’s Islamization and the Protests
Against It, ATLANTIC (June 5, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/interna-
tional/archive/2013/06/muslim-light-whats-behind-turkeys-islamization-and-
the-protests-against-it/276576/ (noting that, according to the government, reg-
ulation of alcohol is necessary for the “public health”).
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countries.165 He weakened the military166 and Constitutional
Court,167 both traditional guardians of secularism.168
The Islamic banks benefited from the rise of the AKP. Officials
from these financial institutions were, for the first time, ap-
pointed to important government positions.169 Restrictions on
branch networks eased.170 Legislation adopted in 2005171 jetti-
soned the term “finance house” in favor of participation bank
and more fully integrated Islamic financial institutions into the
banking system.
165. For a discussion of Turkey’s foreign policy and orientation toward the
east, see Piotr Zalewski, The Self-Appointed Superpower, Turkey Goes It Alone,
27 WORLD POL’Y J. 97 (Winter 2010-2011).
166. According to one commentator, “[t]he days of military coups in Turkey
are officially over.” Omer Taspinar, Turkey’s General Dilemma, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.foreighaffairs.com/articles/68019/omer-
tas[inar/turkeys-general-dilemma. The military directly displaced a civilian
government on three occasions. See Susanna Dokupil, The Separation of
Mosque and State: Islam and Democracy in Modern Turkey, 105 W. VA. L. REV.
53, 62–70 (2002). In 1997, the military forced out the government of Prime
Minister Erbakan in what has been labeled a “soft” coup. See Patrick R. Hugg,
The Republic of Turkey in Europe: Reconsidering the Luxembourg Exclusion,
23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 606, 629 n.132 (2000).
167. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT:
TURKEY 2010 PROGRESS REPORT 7–8 (2010) (“The government put forward a
number of amendments . . . approved in a referendum in September . . . . The
key provisions of the package change the composition of the Constitutional
Court and of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, restrict the authority
of military courts, [and] allow appeals against expulsion decisions by the Su-
preme Military Council to be brought before civilian courts.”).
168. The policies proved popular, with the AKP winning reelection in 2007
and 2011. See Ashleigh Hebert, The Likelihood of Turkey’s Accession into the
European Union: A Controversial Inquiry, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L& COMP. L. 1,
9 (2013) (noting that, in 2011, AKP won 327 out of 550 seats with 49.83 percent
of the vote; in 2007, 341 out of 550 seats with 46.58 percent).
169. Kemal Unakitan, a board member of both Turkiye Finance and Al
Baraka, became the finance minister. The general manager of Al Baraka,
Adnan Buyukdeniz, was slated to become the head of the central bank until
the appointment was blocked by the president of Turkey. The appointment,
however, was rejected by Ahmet Nejdet Sezer, the country’s president.
YURDAKOK, supra note 159. When AL Baraka opened its new headquarters in
2011, the PrimeMinister attended. See Al Baraka Turk HQ Opened by Turkish
PM, CPI FINANCIAL (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.gulfbase.com/news/al-baraka-
turk-hq-opened-by-turkish-pm/178744.
170. As a result, the number of branches for participation banks increased
significantly. See infra notes 193–94 and accompanying text.
171. See generally Banking Law No. 5411 (2008) (Turk.), reprinted at
www.tbb.org.tr/english/5411.doc.
446 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:2
The AKP did away with the system of deposit insurance oper-
ated by the participation banks. The government brought the Is-
lamic banks under the umbrella of the Savings Deposit Insur-
ance Fund (SDIF), the same system used by commercial
banks.172 Article 63 of the Banking Law extended insurance cov-
erage to deposits in participation accounts.173
Premiums were to be risk-based and paid by the bank, not the
customer.174 The Law did not require the segregation of premi-
ums from commercial and Islamic banks, nor require the invest-
ment of premiums from participation banks into Islamic compli-
ant instruments. Funds to assist the bailout of a failed Islamic
bank were not confined to the premiums paid by participation
banks.175
The ability to raise long term capital also improved.176 Reforms
in 2010 permitted the issuance of Islamic compliant bonds.177
172. Discussion Paper, supra note 78, at 2 (noting that in 2005, “the Islamic
system was absorbed by the conventional system, and it is now administered
by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund”).
173. Banking Law No. 5411, art. 63 (2011) (Turk.), reprinted at
www.tbb.org.tr/Dosyalar_eng/Yasal_Duzenlemeler/Bank-
ing_Law_No_5411/Banking_Law_March_2011.doc.
174. Id. (noting that credit institutions shall “insure their . . . participation
funds” and “shall pay the premium.”). The provision does not legally mandate
a Sharia compliant system. Presumably a system could be implemented in
practice that seeks to meet the constructs of Sharia. Whether such a system
would be sufficient is unclear.
175. Yuksel, supra note 160 (“According to the former law, whereas it was
not possible to transfer the distressed participation banks to the Fund, subject
to the article 71, Banking Law No. 5411, it is allowed, in case of existence of
the conditions, that participation banks can be transferred to the Fund as in
the deposit banks.”).
176. The main source of long term capital was from public offerings. Asya
Bank went public in 2006. Id. (“In 2006, the bank floated 23 percent of its
shares on the Istanbul Stock Exchange in the first initial public offering for a
participation bank in the country since Ihlas Finans collapsed. By 2010 it
floated 52.5% of its shares.”).
177. This included changes to the tax code. See Mushtak Parker, Turkish
Parliament Passes Tax Neutrality Law for Sukuk Al-Ijhara, ARABNEWS (Mar.
7, 2011), http://www.arabnews.com/node/370280. The Capital Markets Board
issued regulations in 2010 that permitted sukuk bonds based upon the princi-
ple of Ijhara (leasing). In 2013, the Board issues regulations that permitted
other types of Islamic bonds. For a discussion of these changes, see Burak Gen-
coglu, Communique on Lease Certificates, JD SUPRA BUSINESS ADVISOR (June
10, 2013), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/communiqu-on-lease-certifi-
cates-sukuk-80116/. For a discussion of these changes, see Taxation of Sukuk
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Kuveyt Turk took quick advantage of the authority, issuing
bonds the same year,178 with Turkiye Finans179 and Bank
Asya180 doing so the following year, raising $500 million and
$250 million respectively. Al Baraka likewise indicated plans to
enter the bond market.181
The ability to issue Islamic compliant bonds reduced depend-
ency on short term deposits182 and provided greater access to
capital from outside the country.183 The instruments facilitated
longer term loans and capital improvements, including the ex-
pansion of branch networks.
The Erdogan government also took steps to ease the liquidity
concerns of the participation banks. Unable to invest short term
funds in interest bearing securities issued by the government,
(Leasing Certificate) in Turkey, TURKISH GOV.,
http://www.gep.gov.tr/tmp/_Gep4.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
178. The participation bank raised funds in 2010, see PROSPECTUS, KT
TURKEY SUKUK LIMITED (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.lon-
donstockexchange.com/specialist-issuers/islamic/kt-turkey-prospectus.pdf,
and again in 2011. See PROSPECTUS, KT SUKUKVARLIKKIRALAMAA.Ş, (Oct. 27,
2011), http://www.londonstockexchange.com/specialist-issuers/is-
lamic/ktsukuk31102016.pdf [hereinafter KT SUKUK].
179. Turkiye Finance Prospectus, supra note 139, at 5. See also Türkiye Fi-
nans’ $500 mln Sukuk Sale Lures Investors, HURRIYET DAILY NEWS (May 7,
2013), http://huriyetdailynews.com/turkiye-finans-500-mln-sukuk-sale-lures-
investors.aspx?pageID=46325&NewsCatID=346.
180. See ASYA SUKUK PROSPECTUS, supra note 141.
181. Al Baraka Türk Works on USD200 mil Sukuk, AMILIN.TV (June 20,
2013), http://www.amilin.tv/news/al-baraka-turkish-works-to-issue-usd-200-
mil-sukuk/.
182. See Parker, supra note 177, at 2 (official at Kuveyt Turk noting “a major
problem for participation banks in terms of long-term borrowing requirements.
The conventional banks can borrow through bond issues on a three-year or
five-year basis and the taxation side was cleared a long time ago. The same is
needed for the participation banks and there is only one way this can be done
which is the sukuk route.”). See also Turkiye Finance Prospectus, supra note
139, at 115 (“Deposits are Turkiye Finans’main source of debt funding. Depos-
its of Turkiye Finans comprise customers’ current and profit sharing ac-
counts.”).
183. Alaa Shahine & Sibel Akbay, HSBC Sees 2013 Sukuk Sales Doubling to
$3 Billion: Turkey Credit, BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 7, 2013, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-07/hsbc-sees-2013-sukuk-sales-dou-
bling-to-3-billion-turkey-credit.html (“Turkiye Finans . . . said yesterday it re-
ceived $1.9 billion in bids, with the Middle East accounting for 51 percent of
demand.”).
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the Islamic banks struggled to find safe and liquid Sharia com-
pliant instruments.184 In 2009, the Turkish government issued
index bonds that tied the return to the revenues from certain
state institutions.185 Several of the participation banks invested
in the securities186 but reversed course after concerns were
raised about the compliance of the instruments with Sharia.187
Following a resounding electoral victory in 2011, the AKP au-
thorized the government to issue bonds that were, for the first
time, explicitly designed to comply with Sharia. A year later, the
government raised $1.5 billion in Islamic compliant securities
that were reviewed and approved by Sharia scholars.188 Moreo-
ver, the government indicated that it would issue the securities
184. At least some of the participation banks were forced to invest short term
funds in instruments located outside of Turkey. These included purchases of
commodities in the London Metal Exchange. See KAREN HUNT-AHMED,
CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC FINANCE: INNOVATIONS, APPLICATIONS AND BEST
PRACTICES 126 (2013).
185. REPUBLIC OFTURK., UNDERSECRETARIAT OFTREASURY, REVENUE INDEXED
BONDS: INVESTORS GUIDE 1, http://www.iefpedia.com/english/wp-content/up-
loads/2010/05/REVENUE-INDEXED-BONDS.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
186. Turkish Cleric’s Article on Bonds Disturbs Islamic lenders, HURRIYET
DAILY NEWS (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-cler-
ics-article-on-bonds-disturbs-islamic-lend-
ers.aspx?pageID=238&nID=17247&NewsCatID=346 [hereinafter Turkish
Cleric’s] (“According to data released by the Participation Banks’ Union, as of
March three participation banks held a total of 984 million Turkish Liras
worth of revenue-linked bonds.”). Kuveyt Turk did not purchase the bonds be-
cause of concern regarding compliance with Sharia. See AHMET FARUK AYSAN,
TURKISH SUKUK MARKET AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 32 (2012),
http://www.iib.yildiz.edu.tr/login/sys/admin/news/img/1337775713_Turk-
ish%20Sukuk%20Market%20and%20Recent%20Develop-
ments_15%20Mayis%20showcase.pdf.
187. See Turkish Cleric’s, supra note 186.
188. See REPUBLIC OF TURK., UNDERSECRETARIAT OF TREASURY, US
$1,500,000,000 LEASE CERTIFICATES DUE 2018, at 2 (Sept. 19, 2012),
http://www.ise.ie/debt_documents/Prospectus%20-%20Standalone_91ba3b58-
eaaa-4a87-a992-a95fee49c1f3.pdf (“The transaction structure relating to the
Certificates (as described in this prospectus) has been approved by the Islamic
Finance Advisory Boards of the Joint Lead Managers and Dar Al Sharia Legal
and Financial Consultancy LLC.”). Most of the securities were sold to investors
in the Middle East. Nevzat Devranoglu, UPDATE 1-Turkey’s Debut Sukuk At-
tracts High Gulf Demand, REUTERS, Sept. 19, 2012, available at http://in.reu-
ters.com/article/2012/09/19/turkey-sukuk-idINL5E8KJ25L20120919 (“The 5-
1/2 year bond attracted an order book of nearly five times the issue size, the
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on a regular basis,189making the instruments a dependable com-
ponent of the capital markets and a permanent source of liquid-
ity for the participation banks.190
The removal of restraints on operations and the integration
into the deposit insurance system provided participation banks
with a more favorable operating environment. Likewise, the
public appeared more comfortable with the presence of Sharia
compliant financing.191 The result was significant growth. The
percentage of deposits increased significantly.192 The number of
branches jumped from 110 in 2000, to 829 in 2012, to 966 in
Treasury said late on Tuesday, with Middle Eastern accounts taking 58 per-
cent of the issue. European investors bought 13 percent and Asian accounts 12
percent, while 9 percent was sold in Turkey and 8 percent to U.S. investors.”).
189. Nevzat Devranoglu, Mideast Money: Turkey Steps Up Islamic Finance
Push as Sensitivities Ease, CNBC (May 29, 2013),
http://wwww.cnbc.com/id/100773006 (“The Treasury aims to issue lira-denom-
inated Ijarah sukuk at least twice a year, one each February and the other
each August or September, to build a healthy lira-denominated sukuk curve.
Each issue is expected to be around 1.5 billion lira.”).
190. See Interview with Derya Gurek, CEO of Türkiye Finans (2013),
http://www.thebusinessyear.com/vip_interview/1505/v_-derya-gurerk (“In the
participation banking sector, there are challenges in terms of excess liquidity
management. However, with the recent regulatory reforms and the lease cer-
tificate market growing, this will be resolved . . . . [T]he lease certificate gives
us the chance to gain improved returns on our overnight facilities. We can fun-
nel our customers’ money into these overnight channels.”).
191. Devranoglu, supra note 188 (“Turkey has a strong secular identity. . . .
But nervousness about Islamic finance has eased in recent years, helped by
growth of the sector in Western economies.”).
192. See Risk Management in Participation Banks: Case of Turkey (Oct.
2014), slide 3, http://www.comcec.org/UserFiles/File/WorkingGroups/Finan-
cial3/Presentations/6.TKBB.pdf (“Beginning of the era 2000, while participa-
tion banks reach only 2%of the net assets, in 2010 the rate increased up to
4,3%. As a result of the momentum of high growth in the last 5 years, the rate
increased up to 6, 1% with 90,7 billion TL asset in the third quarter of 2013.”).
450 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:2
2013,193 and to 1083 by March, 2015,194 with promises of addi-
tional expansion.195 The larger branch network provided partic-
ipation banks with greater access to those customers seeking in-
terest-free financial services.196
193. See SUNA AKTEN ÇÜRÜK, FACTORS EFFECTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ISLAMICFINANCE IN TURKEY, available at http://www.aca-
demia.edu/7722393/Factors_Effecting_The_Development_of_Islamic_Fi-
nance_in_Turkey (last visited April 1, 2015) (noting that participation banks
went from 110 branches in 2000 to 685 in 2011, 829 in 2012, and 966 in 2013).
Growth has been faster than traditional commercial banks. See Ferhat Sayım
& Murat Alakel, The Participation Banking and Its Comparison with Deposit
Banking in the Turkish Finance Market, 5 EUR. INTEGRATION STUD., 152, 162
(2011), http://www.ktu.lt/lt/mokslas/zurnalai/eis/05/Sayim_Alakel_2011_152-
164p.pdf (“Putting three public banks aside, while 29 private deposit banks
have 223 branches on an average, each of 4 participation banks has 140
branches on an average. However in terms of the increase rate of branches
from 2008 to 2009, it is seen that participation banks reached a two times big-
ger increase rate of branch numbers than deposit banks.”).
194. PARTICIPATION BANKS ASSOCIATION OF TURKEY,
http://www.tkbb.org.tr/banks-and-banking-sector-information-member-banks
(last visitedMar. 31, 2015) (Kuveyt Türk had the largest number, 320, followed
by Asya, 281, Turkiye, 280, and Al Baraka, 202).
195. See BANK ASYA, PARTICIPATION BANKING OVERVIEW 6 (Aug. 2012),
http://www.bankasya.com.tr/en/_pdf/bank_asya_presentation_2012.pdf (not-
ing Bank Asya’s goal of increasing the number of branches to 300 by 2015). See
also AL BARAKA, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 34 (2012), http://www.al-
baraka.com/media/pdf/AnnualReports/ABG_AnnualReport_English_2012.pdf
(“Al Baraka Turkey intends to maintain its steady expansion, including 20 new
branches a year over the next 4 years”); Turkiye Finance Prospectus, supra note
139, at 73 (“Turkiye Finans plans to open 26 more branches in Turkey during
2013, which will result in a branch network comprising 246 branches at the
end of the current financial year.”).
196. Religious reasons are a key factor in the selection of a participation
bank. See H. Saduman Okumus & Elif Guneren Genc, Interest Free Banking
in Turkey: A Study of Customer Satisfaction and Bank Selection, 9 EUR. SCI. J.
144, 155 (2013) (“it was noted that religious reasons solely was the most im-
portant criterion for choosing to deal with a PB.”). See also Delphine Strauss,
Islamic Finance: Ambitious Growth Targets Set by Country’s ‘Participation
Banks,’ FINANCIAL TIMES (May 4, 2010, 4:47 PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/43c9bcf4-5713-11df-aaff-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1Xor9HWwB (“Mr. Utku estimates 70 to 80 percent
of Albaraka’s depositors choose the bank for religious reasons and will not de-
fect to commercial banks. This pattern could be reinforced, as more branches
open in rural, conservative areas where many people previously shunned
banks altogether.”); Baskan, supra note 134, at 234 (quoting official at Bank
Asya who described customers as “conservative Turkish people, who are reluc-
tant to deposit their money in conventional banks because of interest”). At least
some customers have not opened accounts with participation banks because of
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V. THE EFFECTS OF REFORM
Despite the Islamic leanings of the AKP, reform in the finan-
cial sector did not always appear to comport with the require-
ments of Sharia. This could be seen with particular clarity in the
implementation of a system of deposit insurance.
Likewise, the participation banks found themselves more fully
able to compete in the financial markets. At the same time, how-
ever, Sharia amounted to a layer of regulation that sometimes
made financial products less convenient than those offered by
traditional commercial banks. This could be seen in connection
with the issuance of Islamic compliant credit cards.
A. Deposit Insurance
Participation banks gained competitively from changes in the
system of deposit insurance. By integrating the Islamic banks
into a system that combined the premiums from commercial and
Islamic banks, the government made available greater expertise
and a deeper pool of funds in the event of a failure of a partici-
pation bank. The change effectively eliminated a competitive
disadvantage for the participation banks.197 With memories of
the failure of Ihlas still fresh, depositors gained greater assur-
ance that they would be repaid quickly in the event of a bank
failure.198 At the same time, however, these benefits came
through the implementation of a system that arguably did not
fully comply with Islamic principles.
the lack of available branches. See Okumus & Genc, supra, at 152 (noting a
study that concluded that “[m]ost of the respondents chose to deal with a con-
ventional bank as well as a PB since the PBs did not have a widespread branch
network.”).
197. See Okumus & Genc, supra note 196, at 161 (“Based on the sample data,
it appears that customers; however, are well aware of that their PLS accounts
with the PBs are guaranteed by the Assurance Fund, that is the one of the
main criterion for the customers’ loyalty, though constituting contrary to the
original Islamic banking paradigm.”).
198. Likewise no run occurred when banking authorities took over manage-
ment of Asya Bank in 2015. See BDDK Balks at Giving Up Control over Bank
Asya, TODAY’S ZAMAN (Mar. 9, 2015, 5:31 PM), http://www.to-
dayszaman.com/business_bddk-balks-at-giving-up-control-over-bank-
asya_374758.html The situation was not, however, a result of a financial fail-
ure. Banking authorities did so not because of financial insolvency but as a
result over the failure to submit documents relating to ownership in the finan-
cial institution. Id.
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B. Growth, Competition, and the Participation Banks
Despite more auspicious circumstances, Islamic banks in Tur-
key largely remained niche players. Total assets rose but, in
2013, remained slightly more than 5 percent.199 Moreover, at
least according to one study, these financial institutions re-
mained less profitable than their commercial counterparts.200
While better able to reach customers who selected banking re-
lationships primarily on the basis of religious compliance,201 Is-
lamic banks did not limit their activities to this modest segment
of the market. They also competed for customers who relied on
199. See Conventional Banks Assets Expand 4.2 Percent YTD by End Mar’13
Total Deposits Show Marked Increase, ARAB TIMES, http://www.arab-
timesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/196561/t/Conven-
tional-banks-assets-expand-4.2-percent-YTD-by-end-Mar-
%E2%80%9913/Default.aspx (last updated Jan. 4, 2015) (noting study that
found that participation banking assets accounted for 5.2 percent of all bank-
ing assets in Turkey as at end-March 2013). The market share of participation
banks does not necessarily capture all of the demand by religious customers.
Most noticeably, customers may deposit funds in non-interest accounts at com-
mercial banks. Even among participation banks, these accounts are not un-
common. See H. Saduman Okumus, Interest Free Banking in Turkey: A Study
of Customer Satisfaction and Bank Selection Criteria. 26 J. ECON.
COOPERATION, 61, 73 (2005) (78 percent of those surveyed had demand depos-
its; only 36.6 percent had participation accounts).
200. Ali Soylu & Nazif Durmaz, Profitability of Interest-Free Versus Interest-
Based Banks in Turkey, 46 AUSTL. ECON. REV. 176, 186 (2013) (“Our results
from this Turkish sample showed that interest-free banks did have positive
and reasonably strong rates of profitability, though their level of profitability
was somewhat less than that of traditional banks”). This is reinforced by the
fact that non-government owned commercial banks in Turkey have not sought
licenses to operate participation banks.
201. Evidence suggests that the number of customers seeking banking rela-
tionships based on religious principles is not large. See ISTANBUL: KONDA
RESEARCHGROUP, RELIGION, SECULARISM AND THEVEIL INDAILYLIFE 26 (2009),
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/158353673/KONDA-Religion-
Secularism-and-the-Veil-in-Daily-Life#scribd (discussing a study indicating
that only four percent of Turks defined themselves as “fully devout” and that
52 percent considered themselves non-religious or non-believers). Moreover,
customers at participation banks often have accounts at commercial banks. See
Okumus & Genc, supra note 196, at 155 (“It appears that almost 45 per cent
of the respondents held accounts and/or utilised the products/services offered
by the PBs. 55 per cent, however, indicated that they banked in a conventional
bank as well as a PB . . . . [O]f those who preferred dealing with both PBs and
conventional banks, about 66 percent cited some products not available at PBs
while almost 54 percent attributed insufficient branch network of PBs.”).
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the traditional commercial banks.202 Success, therefore, de-
pended upon an ability to match rates of return203 as well as the
quality and variety of services.204 The need to do so was particu-
larly important with respect to credit cards.
Credit cards represent an essential service for financial insti-
tutions in Turkey.205 The country has one of the highest rates of
202. Okumus & Genc, supra note 196, at 152 (“In recent years it seems that
Islamic banks has been striving to capture the highest number of customers to
compete with conventional banks by providing a large number of products as
an alternative to commercial ones.”). Indeed, Bank Asya views its primary com-
petitors not as the other participation banks but the large commercial banks.
See ASYA SUKUK PROSPECTUS, supra note 141, at 101–02 (“Bank Asya faces
competition primarily from large and medium-sized private banks operating
in Turkey. Although these banks are not participation banks, Bank Asya,
which has a market share in assets of approximately 1.6 per cent., considers
its main competitors to be Garanti Bank, Yapı Kredi and Denizbank.”).
203. Customers at participation banks are not unaffected by changes in the
rate of return. See Yunus Emre & Etem Hakan Ergec, The Efficiency of Partic-
ipation and Conventional Banks in Turkey: Using Data Envelopment Analysis,
57 INT’L RES. J. FIN., 156 (2010) (“It has been found in many empirical re-
searches that the change in interest rates may affect not only the deposits in
conventional banks but also the deposits kept in participation banks.”). Thus,
for example, rates of return paid to depositors in participation accounts have
largely tracked the interest rate paid by commercial banks. See Serhan Cevik
& Joshua Charap, The Behavior of Conventional and Islamic Bank Deposit Re-
turns in Malaysia and Turkey 6–7 (IMFWorking Paper No. 11/156, 2011) (not-
ing that participation accounts with a one year maturity paid, from 1997-2010,
an average return of 44 percent and a median return of 35 percent, while com-
mercial banks paid an average of 44.6 percent and a median of 29.2 percent).
204. Participation banks have sought to introduce innovative products such
as gold trading accounts. See ASYA SUKUK PROSPECTUS, supra note 141, at 95
(“Gold accounts enable customers to invest in gold (buy or sell).”); Turkiye Fi-
nance Prospectus, supra note 139, at 80 (“Turkiye Finans’ gold participation
accounts are opened by customers depositing gold with the bank. . . . The col-
lected gold can be deposited either to the customer’s gold current account to
protect the gold from larceny or to a gold participation account, a new type of
account which provides interest-free yield for account holders. Turkiye Finans
trades the gold and at maturity of the account, returns the gold to the cus-
tomer. If any profit is generated during the trading activity, part of the profit
is passed onto the customer according to a pre-agreed ratio.”); AL BARAKA
ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 195, at 26 (“In keeping with current market
trends, Al Baraka Türk introduced its ‘Gold Participation Account’, a product
offered to customers as a way of putting their otherwise idle holdings of gold to
work.”).
205. See AL BARAKA ANNUAL REPORT 2012, supra note 195, at 104 (“From
among those who use financial services, most popular service used were credit
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credit card use in the world and ranks second in Europe.206
Growth has been explosive, with credit card ownership rates
more than doubling from 2003 to 2013 to approximately 54 mil-
lion.207 As a result, they have been labeled an “indispensable
tool[] of daily lives” in Turkey.208
Credit cards are, however, complex products. They are highly
regulated,209 with limits on the number of installments210 and
the amount of available credit.211 Sharia compliance poses addi-
tional challenges. Adherence to religious principles can render
credit cards less convenient than those issued by traditional
cards (82 percent). this was true for both participation and non-participation
banking respondents.”).
206. G. Gulsun Akin, et al., Credit Card Satisfaction and Financial Literacy:
Evidence from an Emerging Market Economy, 48 EMERGING MARKETS FIN. &
TRADE 103, 103 (2012) (describing Turkey as “the second-largest market in Eu-
rope [for credit cards] after the United Kingdom.”).
207. In fact, Turkey is the second-largest user of credit cards in Europe. See
Turkey Second Largest Credit Card User in Europe, DAILY SABAH (May 11,
2014), http://www.dailysabah.com/markets/2014/05/11/turkey-second-largest-
credit-card-user-in-europe (as of May, 2014, Turkey had 54.3 million credit
cards, second in Europe only to Great Britain).
208. Ahmet Faruk Asyan & Lerzan Yildiz, The Regulation of the Credit Card
Market in Turkey, 11 INT’L RESEARCH J. FIN. & ECON. 141, 143 (2007) (“Credit
cards have become one of the indispensable tools of daily lives in Turkey.”). See
also id., at 4 (“Turkish consumers skipped the personal check-account stage
altogether and moved directly from cash to plastic in the mid-1990s.”).
209. The government regulates the “profit share” See BANK CARDS & CREDIT
CARDS L. No. 5464 § 27 (2006) (Turk.), available at
http://www.tbb.org.tr/en/banking-legislation/other-regulations/16.
210. See AMENDING& REVISING THE LAW ON BANK CARDS & CREDIT CARDS L.
NO. 5915, art. 1 (2009) (Turk.) (minimum payments must be at least 20 percent
and as much as 40 percent of the debt accrued in the current period), available
at http://www.tbb.org.tr/en/banking-legislation/other-regulations/16
211. BANK CARDS & CREDIT CARDS L. No. 5464, § 9 (2006) (Turk.), available
at http://www.tbb.org.tr/en/banking-legislation/other-regulations/16.
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commercial banks.212 Eliminating these inconveniences, in turn,
can raise concerns about the religious credibility of the card.213
1. Sharia Compliance
All of the participation banks rely on a Sharia advisory board
to ensure compliance with Islamic principles.214 Before issuing a
212. Consumers unhappy with the limits can avoid them by obtaining credit
cards from traditional commercial banks in Turkey. Opinions are divided on
whether it is permissible to use a credit card that charges interest even where
balances are repaid before such a charge is imposed. See THE COUNCIL, supra
note 32, (“It is impermissible in Sharī’ah to issue a Credit Card or use it if its
conditions include imposition of usurious interest. This is so even if the card
bearer has the intention to pay within the moratorium period that precedes
imposition of interest.”). Some scholars, however, take to opposite view and
treat the acquisition of a card from a commercial bank as acceptable so long as
balances are paid off before any interest charge is imposed. See Monzer Kahf,
Fatwa on Credit Cards: Signing Credit Cards’ Contract and Using It 8 (Aug. 8,
2001), http://monzer.kahf.com/fatawa/2000-
2002/FATAWA_CREDIT_CARDS.pdf. Use of these cards in the Islamic com-
munity is apparently widespread. See Umar Mohammed Idris & Muhammad
Tahir Jan, Effect of Credit Cards on Customers’ Spending Behavior: A Com-
parative Analysis of Islamic and Conventional Credit Cards, Third Interna-
tional Conference on Management, Malaysia, at 508 (June 10-11, 2013),
http://www.internationalconference.com.my/proceeding/3rdICM_proceed-
ing/034_117_3rdICM2013_Proceeding_p500.pdf
(noting that the “[r]eligious factor seems to be significantly absent in influenc-
ing the decision of the consumers towards selecting the credit card of their
choice. Hence, the reason they spend money using credit card is not related to
religion but to the benefits, risk, and quality they avail.”).
213. A Growth Model for Islamic Banking, in THE MCKINSEY QUARTERLY 7
(Oct. 2005), http://www.ibrahimm.com/Islamic%20Bank-
ing/ARTICLES/A%20Growth%20Model%20For%20Islamic%20Banking.pdf
(“although innovation offers customers greater choice, a bank’s credibility
within the Islamic community could be put at risk if its products and services
were to draw criticism from Islamic scholars.”). See ALBARAKAANNUALREPORT
2012, supra note 195, at 69 (noting that for participation banks, “[a]dhering to
Islamic rules [is] a critical challenge to participation banking adoption”).
214. The Bank Asya Board includes: Professor Dr. Hayrettin Karaman, Pro-
fessor Dr. Hamdi Donduren, Professor Dr. Hamza Aktan and Assoc Dr. Ishak
Emin Aktepe. See ASYA SUKUK PROSPECTUS, supra note 141, at 129. The Board
for Turkiye Finans includes: Dr. Hayrettin Karaman and Dr. Ishak Emin Ak-
tepe. See Turkiye Finance Prospectus, supra note 139, at 111. Dr. Aktepe has
written in this area. See İSHAK EMIN AKTEPE, KREDÝKARTI SÝSTEMÝ VE ÝSLÂM
HUKUKUAÇISINDANDEÐERLENDÝRÝLMESÝ (Credit Card System and the Evalu-
ation of İslamic Law) (2010), available at http://dergipark.ulak-
bim.gov.tr/daad/article/viewFile/5000077085/5000071123. Kuveyt Turk relies
on a five person board that includes scholars from outside of Turkey. See KT
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credit card, therefore, these advisors must review and approve
the product, a process arguably made more complicated at some
of these financial institutions by the diversity of expertise among
the advisors.215
All four of the participation banks issue credit cards, with
Bank Asya having the largest share of the market.216 Consistent
with Sharia, the participation banks do so on an interest-free
basis. Three of them rely on Murabaha,217 or cost-plus, an ap-
proach approved by Sharia scholars in Turkey.218 Under this ap-
proach, customers, as part of the account opening process, are
designated as agents of the bank. At the time of the purchase,
the bank acquires the goods and immediately resells them to the
cardholder with a mark-up or “profit-share.”219 This allows card-
holders to maintain a balance and provides banks with a fixed
return.
Sukuk, supra note 178, at 133 (including Associate Professor Anwar Shuaib
Abdulsalam, Sheikh Shefik Karanfil, Associate Professor Yusuf Bayindir, As-
sociate Professor Abdullah Durmus and Dr. Ertugrul Boynukalin). The four
members of the advisory board for Al Baraka Turk can be found here: See AL
BARAKA TURK ANNUAL REPORT 2012: ORGANIZATION CHART, http://www.al-
baraka.com.tr/rapor/pdf/en2-5.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2015).
215. Some of the participation banks rely only on Sharia scholars from Tur-
key. Others, however, rely on scholars from outside the country. Thus, the ad-
visory board at Al Baraka Turk includes two scholars from Turkey (Professor
Karaman and Professor Donduren) and two scholars from outside of Turkey
(Abdul Sattar Abu Guddah and Ahmed Mohyuiddin Ahmed). See Annual Re-
port 2012 ORGANIZATION CHART, supra note 214.
216. At the end of 2012, Bank Asya ranked eleventh in the number of credit
cards issued. See BANK ASYA, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 15 (2012),
http://www.bankasya.com.tr/en/_pdf/2012_Annual_Report.pdf. Credit cards
have been described as “one of the most profitable products” offered by the
bank. See ASYA SUKUK PROSPECTUS, supra note 141, at 95 (“Bank Asya consid-
ers credit cards to be one of its most profitable products across all of its busi-
ness activities.”). The Bank was also, apparently, the first Islamic financial
institution to issue a true credit card. See Murat Çokgezen & Timur Kuran,
Between Consumer Demand and Islamic Law: The Evolution of Islamic Credit
Cards in Turkey (ERID Working Paper No. 182, Jan. 19, 2015), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2553445 (“The first bona fide Islamic credit card—one
that allowed the holder to pay for purchases in installments—was issued by
Bank Asya in 2002.”).
217. Al Baraka Turk does not rely onMurabaha and does not permit balances
to be rolled over.
218. See AKTEPE, supra note 214.
219. Türkiye Finans Credit Card, TURKIYE FINANS, http://www.turkiye-
finans.com.tr/en/retail_banking/credit_card/credit_card.aspx (last visited Feb.
17, 2015) (“The profit share rate applicable to the minimum payment option is
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Al Baraka Turk does not rely on murabaha. Instead, the bank
offers a “no interest” card that guarantees repayment to mer-
chants but does not allow cardholders to roll over the balance. A
card holder may purchase on installments only where author-
ized by the merchant.220 The card issued by Al Baraka, therefore,
provides short term credit (i.e., the period between the due date
for a payment by the customer and the due date of the payment
to the merchant).
2. Sharia Limits
Sharia imposes at least two sets of restrictions that are not
applicable to traditional credit cards. First, Islamic law limits
the products that can be acquired. Sharia compliant credit cards
in Turkey cannot be used to buy goods that are considered ha-
ram, or sinful. In addition, restrictions may also exist on the pur-
chase of other products such as certain precious metals.221
To enforce these requirements, at least some participation
banks block transactions made at certain types of businesses.
2.34%, excluding taxes and funds, as from the last date for payment.”). See also
Interview with Derya Gurek, supra note 190 (“We are launching a new credit
card-driven product . . . . We decide on the limit, expiration date, and the re-
payment schedule together with our customers. Upon utilization the customers
will be billed throughout the installment period and at a rate agreed upon with
the customer. This way, we know the customer spends that money on an in-
voice.”).
220. In these circumstances, it is the merchant, not the bank, that provides
the right to pay in installments. ALBARAKA, ANNUALREPORT 2011, at 34 (2011),
http://www.albaraka.com/media/pdf/AnnualReports/Al_Baraka_Bank-
ing_Group_Annual_Report_2011.pdf. (Al Baraka “has also commenced the in-
troduction to the market of credit cards payable by installments.”). Installment
purchases require the permission of the merchant. Moreover, the merchant
may limit the number of installment payments. Al Baraka has addressed this
issue by cobranding its card with a large commercial bank. See YAPIKREDI,
ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 14 (2011), available at
http://www.yapikredi.com.tr/ufiles/Investors/AnnualRe-
ports/74_YKB_FRAE_2011_130412.pdf (noting the credit card “co-branding
partnership” with Al Baraka). As a result, the card can provide for installment
sales at all of the merchants within the network belonging to the commercial
bank.
221. Email to author from Bank Official #1 (April 15, 2015) (on file with au-
thor) (noting that some scholars oppose the financing of the purchase of gold
through the use of Murabaha “as they view gold as currency and not as com-
modity”); but see supra note 35.
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Casinos and bars are examples.222 Not all prohibited purchases
can, however, be prevented in this manner. Businesses such as
grocery stores may sell a mix of proper and improper goods. In
these circumstances, the Islamic credit cards do not block the
transactions but rely upon cardholders to refrain from imper-
missible purchases.
Second, not all Islamic credit cards authorize cash advances.223
While this is not prohibited under Islamic law, mark-ups on the
amount borrowed are not authorized. Instead, participation
banks must rely on qard al hassan, or interest-free loans,224 and
cannot charge a fee based upon the amount borrowed.225 As a
result, cash advances are not permitted at all of the participation
banks226 and, where they are allowed, are subject to significant
limits.227
222. Kuveyte Turk blocks transactions for noncompliant merchants, includ-
ing casinos, entertainment centers, adult shops, and bars. Email to author
from Bank Official #2 (Sept. 30, 2011) (on file with author).
223. This has benefits consistent with Sharia. Without cash advances, the
cards are likely to result in lower debit balances and, as a result, present less
default risk for the bank. See UBS, Turkish Participation Banks: UBS Invest-
ment Research, at 30 (Jan. 9, 2009), http://dosya.ekibi.org/pdf/finansekibi-
net/imkb/hissera-
por/200801/ALBRK_ASYAB_UBS_09012008_www.Finans.Ekibi.NET.pdf
(“Of equal importance, credit card customers of participation banks avoid car-
rying large balances on their credit cards for many of the same reasons. In
parallel with this behaviour, the level of problem loans in the credit card seg-
ment remains negligible.”).
224. See Qard al Hassan, PRACTICAL LAW, http://us.practicallaw.com/3-503-
0057?q=&qp=&qo=&qe= (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
225. Turkiye Finans states that cash withdrawals will be done “without bear-
ing any profit share, commission, fee and other extra charge on the amount
you use.” Cash Advance, TURKIYE FINANS, http://www.turkiye-
finans.com.tr/en/retail_banking/credit_card/cash_advance.aspx (last visited
Feb. 17, 2015). In addition, at least some banks may imposed an inflation dif-
ferential on the amount.
226. See UBS Investment Research, supra note 223, at 29 (“On the other
hand, participation banks’ credit cards can only be used for the purchase of
goods/services, and not for cash advances.”).
227. Transaction Limits, KUVEYTTURK,
http://www.kuveytturk.com.tr/pages/transaction_limits.aspx (last visited Feb.
17, 2015) (“The amount of cash advance cannot be more than 10% of the card
limit. The maximum limit is 500 TL both daily and monthly.”). Turkiye Finans
also allows cash advances. See Cash Advance, supra note 225. (“The cash ad-
vance limit is calculated over the card holder’s shopping amount transferred to
the account statement (excluding oversea expenses), meaning that each period
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Third, Islamic compliant credit cards may involve additional
administrative costs. Following a purchase, banks in Turkey
may text the customer, either to provide notification of the trans-
fer or to allow for an opportunity to select an installment period
for repayment.228
3. Sharia Interpretations
Scholars in Turkey have adopted a number of interpretations
of Sharia that allow Islamic credit cards to more closely mimic
those issued by traditional commercial banks. These scholarly
interpretations, however, are not universally accepted. In Tur-
key, it is permissible to impose a charge on cash advances or
other extensions of credit229 designed to compensate for infla-
tion,230 a practice that at least some scholars view as riba.231
Perhaps the most difficult issue for participation banks con-
cerns the imposition of penalties. Sharia in general prohibits the
imposition of these charges. Scholars in Turkey, however, have
indicated approval, so long as the bank gives these funds
away.232 The amount of the penalty is calculated as a percentage
it will vary according to the expense amount transferred to the account state-
ment.”).
228. Çokgezen & Kuran, supra note 216, at 15, n.59.
229. See Çokgezen & Kuran, supra note 216 (noting that all Islamic banks in
Turkey impose a charge reflecting the time value of moen “even though Tur-
key’s highest religious body (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) has ruled the practice
un-Islamic.”).
230. See e.g.,Hayrettin Karaman, There are So Many Banks that Claim to be
“Islamic”, that is “Interest Free Banking”: Could you Explain Please Which
Banks are Preferable, QUESTIONS ON ISLAM (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.ques-
tionsonislam.com/question/there-are-so-many-banks-claim-be-islamic-inter-
est-free-banking-could-you-explain-please-whi (statement by Professor Kara-
man that “[w]hen the private finance house determines the deferred payment
price, it takes some criteria into consideration; among those criteria are infla-
tion, the probable yield of the money in the market when it is invested in other
instruments, and some other things.”).
231. See Shaykh Muhammad ibn Adam al-Kawthari, Is it Permitted to Take
Inflation-adjusted Loans?, http://islamqa.org/hanafi/qibla-hanafi/34599 (last
visited Oct. 26, 2014) (“The above and other evidences prove that when a loan
is paid back then the rate of inflation is not considered according to Shariah.
One can only claim back exactly the amount which was given as loan. Anything
other than this will be considered as [Riba] and thus unlawful (Haram) and
sinful.”). See also AYUB, supra note 16, at 51 (“Interest is sometimes legalized
on account of inflation and decreases in the purchasing power of lent money.
This is also not a valid argument.”).
232. See AKTEPE, supra note 214.
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of the balance owed.233 Some of the participation banks repre-
sent that the funds are donated to charity.234
CONCLUSION
Turkey is an Islamic country that embraces secularism. The
arrival of the AKP altered the traditional balance, with the gov-
ernment easing some restrictions on religious practices. With re-
spect to the financial markets, the AKP brought Islamic banks
more fully into the regulatory regime, allowing them to expand
their branch networks and raise long term funds through the
issuance of Islamic compliant bonds.
The implementation of a more favorable environment, how-
ever, does not support an intent to replace secularism with reli-
gious principles. Nor does it provide significant evidence that
consumers in Turkey routinely elevate religious interests over
economic substance and convenience.
For the most part, the government’s approach entailed the re-
moval of restrictions that limited the ability of the Islamic finan-
cial institutions to compete on equal terms with commercial
banks. Moreover, notwithstanding an Islamic leaning, the gov-
ernment did not entirely embrace Sharia when implementing
reforms. Where religious principles conflicted with the safety
and soundness of the financial markets, the AKP opted for the
latter.
This caution can be seen most clearly in the application of de-
posit insurance to participation banks, after the AKP terminated
a system that arguably complied with Sharia, and integrated
the Islamic banks into one that apparently did not. The ap-
proach may have avoided the mandates of Sharia but arguably
233. See Credit Cards and Bank Cards, Product and Service Fees, BANKASYA,
http://www.bankasya.com.tr/en/credit-cards-and-bank-cards.aspx (last visited
Oct. 26, 2014) (specifying a 2.02% penalty rate). Kuveyt Turk was apparently
the last participation bank to impose the penalty.
234. Çokgezen & Kuran, supra note 216, at 17 (noting that KuveytTürk rep-
resents that it gives the funds to charity). When banks received interest income
from the central bank, at least some of them declined to reflect the payments
in profit and income. See Yuksel, supra note 160 (noting that Al Baraka, “[w]e
use the money for corporate social responsibility projects and sponsorship
agreements. We certainly do not distribute them as dividends.’”). These are
also the participation banks that rely on Islamic scholars from outside of Tur-
key. A certain degree of Sharia risk exists in this area. At least one participa-
tion bank in Turkey withdrew a credit card after cancellation of approval by
its Sharia Board. Email from Banker #2 to Jay Brown (July 31, 2013).
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improved the safety and soundness of the banking system. The
wisdom of the approach was apparent in early 2014 when mas-
sive withdrawals at Bank Asya generated no significant insta-
bility in the financial markets.235
Nor does the improved competitive position of the Islamic
banks suggest a fundamental retreat from secularism by Turk-
ish consumers. The participation banks obtained greater free-
dom to compete in the financial markets. They took the oppor-
tunity to expand the size of their branch networks and increase
their market share. Nonetheless, they remained a modest com-
ponent of the financial system, suggesting limits on the popular-
ity of religious-based banking.
Even where participation banks have targeted segments dom-
inated by the traditional commercial banks,236 they have had
only modest success. For example, all four participation banks
have issued credit card products. Moreover, they have adopted
interpretations of Sharia that allow their credit cards to more
closely mimic those issued by traditional commercial banks. 237
235. Among the founders of Bank Asya were supporters of Fethullah Gulen,
an Islamic cleric who opposed the Erogan government. According to published
reports, “state-owned companies and institutional depositors loyal to Prime
Minister Tayyip Erdogan have withdrawn 4 billion lira ($1.79 billion), some 20
percent of the bank’s total deposits, over the last month to try to sink the
lender.” See Bank Asya Says Weathers Withdrawals in Turkey Crisis, REUTERS,
Jan. 22, 2014, available at http://www.trust.org/item/20140122111631-ryrqv.
With the other participation banks covered by insurance, no panic occurred
similar to the one the followed the collapse of Ihlas. See supra notes 153–58.
236. Turkiye Finance Prospectus, supra note 139, at 76 (“Management be-
lieve there is an opportunity for participation banks to increase growth in the
consumer banking business and Turkiye Finans plans to tap the large and
growing Turkish retail banking market by deepening its relationships with the
“hidden affluent” segment, cross-selling lending products to mass customers
and increasing its branch footprint as well as increasing penetration using al-
ternative distribution channels.”).
237. Çokgezen & Kuran, supra note 216 (noting that credit cards issued by
Islamic banks “perform[] the functions of its conventional counterpart”).
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Nonetheless, restrictions arising from Islamic law remain, re-
ducing the convenience of the cards.238 Perhaps as a result, these
products have not proved especially popular.239
Indeed, the modest penetration of the markets by the four par-
ticipation banks may explain recent government initiatives de-
signed to stimulate activity in the sector. Three government-
owned commercial banks have indicated an interest in operating
a participation bank. In late 2014, bank regulators issued a li-
cense240 to Ziraat Bank,241 with others following.242
The activities of the AKP and the Islamic banks in Turkey,
therefore, suggest less a weakening of secularism and more a
recalibration of the Turkish balance of religious and secular life.
238. The participation banks have also tried to compete on the basis of inno-
vation. Bank Asya has been particularly aggressive developing products that
are linked to transportation expenses. See Press Release, AsyaCard DIT and
DIT Pratik Will Be Used for Transportation in Bolu (Nov. 12, 2011),
http://www.bankasya.com.tr/en/_pdf/AsyaFinans_PressRe-
leases_%282%29.pdf?nrzfkegdxlwsksbj (describing ability to use Bank Asya
credit card and debit card on buses in the Municipality of Bolu). The bank, for
example, became the first in Turkey to require no annual fee on its credit card.
See Press Release, Bank Asya’s Net Profit for 2008 Has Increased 12% and
Reached TL 247 Million Compared to Previous Year (Feb. 23, 2009),
http://www.bankasya.com.tr/en/_pdf/AsyaFinans_PressReleases_(11).pdf (de-
scribing Asya Bank “as the first and only Turkish bank that does not charge
an annual fee for the credit cards”).
239. Although participation banks have more than 5% of the assets in the
banking system, see supra note 200, they have only around 3% of the credit
card market. See Çokgezen & Kuran, supra note 218 (placing the percentage
of credit cards held by participation banks in Turkey at 3.2 percent or 1.8 mil-
lion out of more than 56 million credit cards issued in the country).
240. New Participating Bank Approval, BASPINAR & PARTNERS,
http://www.baspinar.av.tr/UI/AnnouncementDetail.aspx?ID=YyNPJtZcfSA
(last visited April 1, 2015).
241. Ziraat has traditionally provided loans to the agricultural sector. See
ZIRAATBANK, PROSPECTUS 17 (July 1, 2014), http://www.centralbank.ie/regula-
tion/securities-markets/prospectus/Lists/ProspectusDocuments/Attach-
ments/20893/Prospectus%20-%20Series.PDF (“The Bank has been a consistent
source of financial support for agriculture in Turkey throughout its history and
has played a substantial role in both the development and the modernisation
of the Turkish agricultural sector.”). The participation bank will apparently
begin operations in May, 2015. See State-run Ziraat to Launch Islamic Unit in
May, DAILY SABAH (Mar. 17, 2015) http://www.dailysa-
bah.com/money/2015/03/07/staterun-ziraat-to-launch-islamic-unit-in-may.
242. See Vakifbank gets Approval for Participation Bank, Daily Sabah (Mar.
3, 2015), http://www.dailysabah.com/money/2015/03/03/vakifbank-gets-ap-
proval-for-participation-bank.
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The government has allowed participation banks greater free-
dom to provide interest-free services but has itself not always
relied upon a Sharia compliant approach to reform. At the same
time, participation banks have used the opportunity to compete
for customers that do not seek banking relationships solely
through a religious lens. These actions, therefore, have not fun-
damentally altered the modest role of the participation banks in
Turkey or the secular nature of the financial system.
